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Modern states are approaching the issue of terrorism from both kinetic and non-
kinetic perspectives; however, the focus of the international community has 
largely been on terrorist organizations, their leadership and their active and 
passive members, in whom the terrorist ideology is already deeply ingrained, and 
thus, they are difficult to turn toward a peaceful path. However, this thesis 
focuses on would-be terrorists, who may be relatively easier to influence. It 
identifies the possible causes that lead candidates toward the path of terrorism.  
According to Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory, people in the 
losses frame are more risk acceptant and therefore more prone to join terrorists’ 
causes. To counter this risk-acceptant behavior, the answer lies not only in 
identifying possible causes for their placement in the losses frame, but in finding 
ways to transfer the would-be terrorists to a gains frame, thereby preventing 
them from joining the terrorist organizations. By adopting this strategy, there will 
be an indirect influence on the current wave of terrorism in the long-term, as well 
as a benefit in the short term by partially choking the inputs to the terrorists’ 
organizations.   
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Wars are truly won when enemies become friends. Then let’s talk 
to the stranger before we shoot, or at least before we shoot again. 
On some things, we’ll find, we won’t change minds, and on some of 
these things we shouldn’t. But who knows what a world could be 
made if we listen and learn at the camps of fallen angels? 
 –Scott Atran 
In the post-Cold War era, terrorism has emerged as a leading security 
challenge for the entire world; however, terrorism is not a new phenomenon.  Its 
new form is due to new employment tactics and the inclusion of technological 
enablers, which have enhanced its effects at the global level. Terrorism has 
mostly been associated with individuals or groups acting as terrorists, thereby 
demanding that any counterterrorism efforts focus on these individuals and 
groups as targets. This targeting approach has been successful in the shorter 
term; however, in the long term, it has failed to counter the changing face of 
terrorism and the tactics used by the terrorists themselves. Overall, while current 
counterterrorism efforts have been successful at some levels, terrorism as a 
whole still persists. This thesis asserts that to counter the current wave of 
terrorism, the most suitable targets are the inputs; i.e. the would-be terrorist 
candidates, who are most vulnerable not only to terrorist recruitment, but to 
counterterrorism pursuits.   
Looking at terrorism from a quantitative approach (poverty and 
unemployment, lack of education, discrimination, crime statistics, etc.), there are 
various reasons for a person to a join terrorist’s cause.  This research focuses on 
the underlying qualitative factors (loss of identity, religious beliefs, sacred values, 
cultural differences, life experiences, etc.) as well as quantitative factors that put 
a would-be terrorist in the “losses frame” of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Nathan 
Tversky’s Prospect Theory.1 The research asserts that applying measures which 
                                            
1 Daniel Kahneman, and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk,” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263. 
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will bring people from a losses frame to a gains frame will influence the current 
wave of terrorism by choking the inputs mechanism of terrorists’ organizations 
and, thus, decreasing terrorism in the end.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
The current security environment with integrated global counterterrorism 
actions has compelled terrorists to become adaptive, use networks and 
increasingly utilize virtual domains (compared to the physical domain) to attain 
their objectives, thereby making them hardened and less susceptible to 
counterterrorism actions. Therefore, all things being equal, it is comparatively 
easier to influence would-be terrorists (inputs) as open, clear and more specified 
targets, rather than endeavoring to identify cell-structured groups without any 
geographical affinity and then change the hearts and minds of hardened 
terrorists. For any terrorist organization, inputs are extremely important, since it is 
people, guns and money2 that provide the means, opportunities and motivations 
towards the outputs.  Of these inputs, though, the most critical are the people, 
who, if prevented from directly joining the cause of terrorism, would also affect 
the indirect support of it by denying food, material, shelter and information. The 
new approach recommended in this thesis would focus on the wound, instead of 
the bandage, and lead toward measures that will answer the question: How can 
the wound of terrorism be avoided in the first place? 
Many counterterrorism actions, based on the Expected Utility Theory, 
have focused on individuals and societies; however, this thesis will focus on 
individuals and societies from the perspective of Prospect Theory. It will highlight 
why people perceive themselves to be in a losses frame, even without going into 
the requisite cost and benefit analysis, and it will offer a means by which to bring 
them from a losses into a gains frame. By asserting this, however, the authors do 
                                            
2 Gordon H. McCormick, “Leaders, Followers and Organizations” (lecture, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, August 8, 2012). 
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not claim that this is the only way to counter the current wave of terrorism, but 
rather another alternative choice in that effort.  
B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will start by explaining the Prospect Theory of losses and 
gains, and how it can be applied to would-be terrorists. Prospect Theory is based 
on economic preferences of individuals as expressed in a lab environment; these 
preferences are then converted into a mathematical data set. However, in real 
life, there are other subjective aspects of decision making. Therefore, this 
research will analyze the memoirs of different terrorists from past and present, to 
include jihadi, religious, nationalistic, environmental and criminal terrorists. It will 
then apply Prospect Theory in a qualitative manner to the expressed motivations 
of those individuals. This research will focus on two types of terrorists: those who 
went all the way, and those who climbed only a few stairs on the “staircase” of 
Moghaddam3 before turning back to the ground floor. Identifying the underlying 
factors that put people in a losses frame will reveal possible means for 
transferring them into a gains frame by suggesting a way forward for the 
counterterrorism pursuits. By adopting this suggestion, an indirect, long-term 
influence on the current wave of terrorism may be achieved.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
On deterring and influencing terrorism and terrorists, there are two schools 
of thought: the first, held by such authorities as Leites and Wolf, former Secretary 
of State Colin Powell, and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, states 
that terrorists cannot be deterred; hence, the best strategy against them should 
focus on prevention, destruction and offensive action in order to eradicate them. 
The second school of thought, advocated by Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael 
Jenkins, Daniel Whiteneck, Shmuel Bar, Alex Wilner and Andreas Wenger states 
                                            
3 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” 
American Psychologist 60, no. 2 (2005): 162. 
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that rather than abandoning deterrence, it should be redefined and developed 
into a new framework for deterring terrorism.4 
Within the framework of deterring terrorism, Davis and Jenkins highlight 
the importance of the influence component of a deterrence strategy that has both 
a broader range of coercive elements and a range of plausible positives for long-
term success.5 Davis emphasizes two points with regard to classic deterrence 
theory against terrorism: decomposition through offensive actions and influence 
through positive inducements. Going beyond individual terrorists and their groups 
or organizations, Whiteneck emphasizes extending deterrence to the societal 
elements and communities that support terrorism.6 Similarly, Shmuel Bar 
emphasizes the use of tactical deterrence at regular intervals to show the resolve 
of counterterrorism actions, but with the inducement of positive gestures as well.7 
Overall, this school of thought primarily focuses on the functional aspects of a 
counterterrorism strategy possessing a completely opposite, albeit mutually 
reinforcing, two-fold policy: decomposition through kinetic actions, along with 
influence components applied through non-kinetic means such as positive 
inducements. 
In the realm of counterterrorism, James J. F. Forest and Raymond H. 
Hamden assert that, since there are different types of terrorists and they have 
different characteristics, different measures should be taken against them.8 
According to Wenger and Wilner, by desegregating a group engaged in 
terrorism, we have to identify which actors and processes are most susceptible to 
                                            
4 Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner, “Deterring Terrorism: Moving Forward,” in Deterring 
Terrorism, ed. Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 
302. 
5 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A 
Component in the War on al-Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), xviii. 
6 Daniel Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework,” The Washington 
Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2005): 189. 
7 Shmuel Bar, “Deterring Terrorists: What Israel has learned,” Policy Review 149 (2008): 42. 
8 Raymond H. Hamden, “Unresolved Trauma and Thirst for Revenge: The Retributional 
terrorists,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Volume I: Recruitment, ed. James Forest (Westport, CN: 
Praeger Security International, 2006), 170. 
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deterrence.9 This thesis asserts that the current research on deterring terrorism 
has, through both decomposition and influence components, so far been focused 
mainly on the different functional parts of terrorism, such as terrorist leaders, foot 
soldiers, sponsors, financiers, etc. Therefore, targeting the inputs mechanism, 
i.e., would-be terrorists, is a field that requires more research and focus, since 
these individuals are the most susceptible elements of a terrorist organization. 
Audrey Kurth Cronin addresses the role of individuals as sources of 
contemporary terrorism, focusing on innate as well as external factors;10 
however, there is a gap in the analyses of different psychologies, motivations and 
behaviors of potential pools of recruits, living under the same environment, but 
behaving differently.  
According to the Prospect Theory, decision makers (would-be terrorists) 
do not maximize their choices. They are risk averse when confronted with 
choices between gains (preferring lower sure gains over probable higher gains) 
and risk acceptant when confronted with losses (preferring probable bigger 
losses than sure lesser losses).11 Therefore, they are more inclined towards 
losses with respect to comparable gains. According to Jeffrey D. Berejikian, the 
principal distinction between the choices identified in Prospect Theory and 
rational choice lies in the asymmetrical relationship between gains and losses. 
He further writes that “losses hurt more than a gain feels good.”12 Consequently, 
an individual who is already in the losses frame is a potential recruit for terrorist 
organizations because he is more risk acceptant. But why is an individual in the 
losses frame? To answer this, the best approach would lead to an understanding 
of the mindset of a possible terrorist in the losses frame or would highlight the 
                                            
9 Wenger and Wilner, “Deterring Terrorism: Moving Forward,” 307. 
10 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Sources of Contemporary Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: 
Elements of a Grand Strategy, edited by Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, 
DC.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 24. 
11 Kahneman, and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 263. 
12 Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” Journal of Peace Research 39, 
no. 2 (2002): 170. 
 6 
reasons why a person falls into in the losses frame, in order to account 
somewhat for this risk acceptant behavior.  
According to a study by the National Security Institute, there are two kinds 
of factors leading to the radicalization of a would-be terrorist: internal factors such 
as personality, habits, skills and values; and external factors such as family, 
friends, group norms, narratives, opportunities, intergroup conflicts, violence and 
culture.13 In this regard, this thesis asserts that radicalization is a consequence of 
being in the losses frame, rather than a cause, and, therefore, though factors 
leading to a losses frame, as well as radicalization, may seem common, the 
transformation of a would-be terrorist from a losses frame to a gains frame would 
make him more risk averse and less radicalized by default. 
D. HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY 
To influence a would-be terrorist through the application of Prospect 
Theory is a demanding task; however, it is not impossible, since the gap between 
the losses and gains frames is not large, and thus it is possible to bring an 
individual from the losses frame to a gains frame. It is understandable to 
common people that by joining the cause of terrorism, they have much to lose 
immediately, compared to some foreseeable gains. According to the Prospect 
Theory, people react more positively to immediate certainty than to any futuristic 
probability of gains; however, in the current case of terrorism, this seems not to 
be the case. Terrorist organizations are able to convince would-be terrorists to 
join their cause, despite having a farfetched and utopian end state. Why are 
people led towards this path? This point has partially been addressed by Cronin, 
who writes that there are external factors and “innate characteristics that give 
some people more or less proclivity to become terrorists;”14 however, this thesis 
asserts it is the losses frame which leads people to become more risk acceptant.  
                                            
13 Sarah Canna, Carley St. Clair and Abigail Desjardins, Neuroscience Insights on 
Radicalization and Mobilization to Violence: A Review (Medway, MA: National Security Institute, 
2012), 8. 
14 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Sources of Contemporary Terrorism,” 23. 
 7 
In understanding the decision-making process of an individual who 
chooses to become a terrorist, Prospect Theory also provides us with the 
necessary tools to understand the basic framework, as well as the bigger picture. 
Although the choice between good and bad is easy and, in most cases, naturally 
arrived at in favor of good, individual perceptions under the influence of the 
losses frame may lead a would-be terrorist to join a terrorist cause, irrespective 
of being good or bad. To explain this phenomenon, it is generally apparent that 
killing a human being is bad; however, if an individual is in the losses frame due 
to personal, societal or peer pressures, he may be willing to take innocent lives. 
Moreover, beyond perceptions, it is an individual’s expectations that place him in 
the losses frame, irrespective of personal cost and benefits.   
The causes of being in the losses frame may vary from individual to 
individual and from case to case, and these causes range from the ideological to 
the religious, political, cultural, personal and psychological spheres; however, 
these seem to be mostly in the field of intangible and abstract patterns. Being in 
the losses frame is not always about material costs and benefits, it is also about 
cultures and identities. Moreover, both tangible and intangible causes may have 
different meanings for different people, depending upon their geography, as well 
as social, political and cultural moorings.  
E. EVIDENCE AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to understand why people are in the losses frame, this thesis will 
focus on terrorists’ memoirs to understand the dilemma a would-be terrorist faces 
while making a decision. Each individual has a different psychological profile, 
motivations and decision making structures; therefore, the decision to become a 
terrorist is not a homogenous process, and that is why the mind of a would-be 
terrorist may be understood only through reading the memoirs of hardened 
terrorists, as well as the memoirs of individuals who, though inclined towards the 
path of terrorism, did not go all the way and returned en-route. The findings 
within these memoirs will help to confirm the reasons why a would-be terrorist 
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finds himself in the losses frame and, consequently, offer a means by which that 
individual may be transferred towards the gains frame. 
The principal focus of this research is to understand whether there is a 
main determinant for why a would-be terrorist arrives in the losses frame, such 
as a network of friendships, cultural or environment influences, uncertainty, and 
the complexity of situational and generational dynamics, etc., or whether all these 
factors contribute collectively to the losses frame. The process of bringing people 
from a losses frame to a gains frame may be synthesized from terrorists’ different 
backgrounds: individuals from Western societies, immigrant communities in 
Europe and the U.S., people from areas of conflict, youngsters lacking any 
promising future, and outcasts rejected by mainstream society.  
By analyzing the reasons why would-be terrorists from various 
backgrounds join the path of terrorism, it will become easier to identify the 
common causes that place a would-be terrorist in the losses frame. There will 
always be specific causes present in the context of activities or circumstances 
which put people in the losses frame. Consequently, this thesis asserts that 
every individual will probably require a different approach to bring him into the 
gains frame. At one end of the spectrum, this approach may demand the removal 
of social injustices and the installation of equal opportunities to include a 
respectable future for a potential terrorist recruit and his family; whereas, the 
other end may demand respect for his religious, ethnic or cultural values, the 
removal of discrimination due to his native background, physical appearance, 
and religious beliefs.  
Theory helps us understand and predict the past, present and future 
events in simplistic terms, and, therefore, this thesis attempts to prove that it is 
possible to influence a would-be terrorist by understanding the causes of being in 
the losses frame relative to Prospect Theory. In the next chapter, Prospect 
Theory will be explained through the lens of a social sciences’ perspective and 
will be pitted against the menace of terrorism. 
 9 
II. PROSPECT THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
TERRORISM 
A. PROSPECT THEORY 
In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky came up with Prospect 
Theory—a descriptive theory of decision making under risk as an alternative to 
Expected Utility Theory, which “had dominated the analyses of decision making 
under risk”15 until that time. Through Prospect Theory, they argued that 
individuals make choices with regard to gains and losses, and their subsequent 
risk aversion or risk acceptant behavior follows accordingly. These behavior 
patterns showed them that  
people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in 
comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This 
tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in 
choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving 
sure losses.16  
To illustrate this phenomenon, the authors gave the example17 that if a 
person has two choices: a sure gain of $3000 or a 80% probability of gaining 
$4000, 80% of the subjects chose the first option; however, once there was a 
20% probability of gaining $4000 and only a 25% probability of gaining $3000, 
65% people chose the first option, though the overall expected value of this 
option was less compared to the second option. This experiment highlights that 
in the case of having a different probability of two outcomes, people have gone 
for more payoffs, rather than logically going for higher probability of gains. On the 
other side of the spectrum, if the gains are replaced by the losses, people’s 
decisions are entirely opposite of what they do in the case of gains. Accordingly, 
if the above mentioned experiment is altered to losses, i.e., once people were 
told to choose between a sure loss of $3000 or 80% probability of losing $4000, 
                                            
15 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 263. 
16 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 263.  
17 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 268. 
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92% of people chose the second. In the case of probability options, once people 
were told to choose between a 25% chance of losing of $3000 or a 20% chance 
of losing $4000, 58% chose the first option. This tendency shows that people 
become more risk acceptant once the payoffs are in the shape of losses rather 
than gains. The same has been summed up by Kahneman and Tversky:  
In the positive domain, the certainty effect contributes to a risk 
averse preference for a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely 
probable. In the negative domain, the same effect leads to a risk 
seeking preference for a [bigger] loss that is merely probable over a 
smaller loss that is certain. The same psychological principle—the 
overweighing of certainty—favors risk aversion in the domains of 
gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses.18 
In contrast to Prospect Theory, it can be argued that Expected Utility 
Theory is a better model to understand the decision making process, since 
Expected Utility Theory focuses on the principle of rationality and explains that 
reasonable people will try to maximize their gains and minimize their losses, 
thereby showing economic behavior most of the time. However, this only focuses 
on material costs and benefits of the decision making process, without taking into 
account the psychological aspects that influence people’s decision making under 
risk. These psychological aspects could be certainty, probability and possibility.19 
Moreover, Prospect Theory also differentiates between decision making in the 
gains and losses frame of mind, where an individual is either more risk averse or 
risk acceptant, respectively, regardless of the final positive material (economic) 
outcome.  
Furthermore, it is normally perceived that interpretation of the information 
influences the judgments and decisions people make; however, other implicit 
components should also be taken into account before arriving at a decision. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky, this tendency is called the “isolation 
                                            
18 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 268.  
19 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 265. 
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effect,”20 because it “leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is 
presented in different forms.”21 In the experiment explained before, to highlight 
the concepts of certainty and probability, if the outcomes are dissected, it is 
interesting to note that people made decisions on the framing of the prospects, 
rather than rationally arriving at either maximizing their gains or minimizing their 
losses. In the gains frame, people choose $3000, instead of choosing $3200 
(gaining $4000 with 80 % probability), because of the certainty effects; however, 
in the losses frame, people chose the higher loss of $3200 (losing $4000 with 80 
% probability), rather than minimizing their losses to the sure sum of $3000. This 
experiment explains why people’s preferences violate the principles of Expected 
Utility Theory, i.e., “maximizing utility in decision making,” and shows that 
Prospect Theory is a better way to analyze the individual’s patterns of choices 
and illustrate common attitudes towards risk or chance that cannot be captured 
by Expected Utility Theory. 
According to Expected Utility Theory, people should choose a course of 
action where costs are less than benefits, as shown in the graph in Figure 1. If 
the same principle is applied to a would-be terrorist, any decision on or above the 
blue line in the Figure 1 suggests that individual should be deterred from joining 
terrorism’s path because the costs become higher than the benefits. However, in 
the case of Prospect Theory, the outcome is different, depending on whether an 
individual is in a gains or losses frame. Here, an individual’s choices are not 
based on the expected outcome; therefore, his or her decision position is 
different from the outcome shown in Figure 1. This phenomenon has been shown 
in Figure 2, where a would-be terrorist, if in the gains frame, has a bigger window 
of deterrence, compared to a reduced deterrence window in the losses frame.  
                                            
20 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 271. 
21 Kahneman and Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” 271. 
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Figure 1.  The Expected Utility Theory Model 
 
Figure 2.  The Prospect Theory – Comparison of the Gains and the Losses 
Frames 
This raises an important question as to why an individual is not deterred 
when his costs are higher than benefits. The answer may be found in the losses 
frame, which shows that there is a gap between the expected levels of costs and 
benefits, and this is where a would-be terrorist is vulnerable to joining the terrorist 
cause. Being in the losses frame increases the level of accepted costs and 
ultimately leads him to terrorism’s fold. This dilemma has been captured in Figure 
3, where Expected Utility Theory’s decision making has been pitched against the 
decision making in the losses frame. In Figure 3, it can clearly be discerned that 
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there is a gap or a grey area, as well as a window of opportunity, which should 
be tapped to bring people from the losses frame to the gains frame.  
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of the Prospect and Expected Utility Theories 
How do people either place or perceive themselves in the losses or gains 
frame? To answer this, it will be important to apply Prospect Theory to the social 
sciences field because the outcome of this application may, or may not, coincide 
with the strict economic behavior experienced by the authors of Prospect Theory. 
In hindsight, it can be said that people who are satisfied with their lives both 
psychologically and physically will always be in the gains frame; whereas, people 
who are dissatisfied will always be in the losses frame. However, this may not be 
the case, since people even in the losses frame may not always show a risk 
acceptant behavior, and people in the gains frame may opt for the risky path of 
terrorism. Therefore, it will not always be the case that all the people in the 
losses or gains frame, respectively, will turn to, or avoid, the terrorist path, which 
seems to suggest that there are certain shortfalls to Prospect Theory or to the 
application of it beyond the lab environment.  
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B. SHORTFALLS OF PROSPECT THEORY  
In simple terms, studying the human decision making process in 
laboratory experiments is different from studying it in real life, which is more 
complex and involves the effects of diversified circumstances. Thus, applying 
Prospect Theory to a social science problem, instead of a mathematical or 
economics problem, is likely to produce different outcomes, as explained in the 
concluding paragraphs of the previous section. This assertion has also been 
supported by Jonathan Mercer, who writes that some aspects not being 
addressed objectively in Prospect Theory, two of which are most problematic: 
“First, prospect theory provides no insight on how actors locate themselves in a 
domain of gain or loss. … Second, assessing risk acceptance or risk aversion is 
easy in the lab but hard in the field.”22 
After identifying the shortfalls of Prospect Theory in the context of the 
social sciences field, it seems difficult to identify the reasons why a would-be 
terrorist would perceive himself, or herself, in the losses frame. However, this 
shortfall will be addressed in the next section of this chapter in which Prospect 
Theory will be applied to the issue of terrorism, specifically focusing on would-be 
terrorists. By doing so, this thesis attempts to address the shortfalls of Prospect 
Theory, i.e., why people are, or perceive themselves to be, in the losses frame 
and, thus, are more risk acceptant.  
C. APPLICATION OF PROSPECT THEORY TO TERRORISM 
Defining the reasons why an individual perceives himself or herself in the 
losses frame, or a would-be terrorist faces certain losses, may vary according to 
a person’s psychology (personality, emotions, attitudes, motivations, personal 
inadequacies, plight of others), environment (geography, sociology, culture, 
politics, economy, easy access to information), ideology (beliefs, identity, 
narratives, historical contexts) and biology (adolescence, mental vulnerability of 
                                            
22 Jonathan Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” Annual Review Political 
Science 8, no.1 (2005): 3, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104911.  
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the young, copying elders, criminality for excitement). This potential variance 
would mean that for a nationalist, the reason which puts him in the losses frame 
may be loss of identity; whereas, for an environmentalist, the reason may be the 
destruction or overuse of natural resources. To overcome one of the shortfalls of 
Prospect Theory, one must accept that such underlying reasons are relative to 
different perspectives; the perception of being in the losses or gains frame varies 
from individual to individual, or from group to group. However, it can be argued 
that there are certain individuals or groups who do not have any nationalistic or 
environmental cause behind their drift into the losses frame; yet for such 
individuals and groups, the answer may lie in their psychological, biological or 
environmental domains.  
In the realm of the decision-making process of a would-be terrorist, does 
his decision making involve reason? To answer this, it can be expected that in 
the losses frame, a rational would-be terrorist perceives himself to have fewer 
alternatives. According to Allison and Zelikow, “the rationality in the decision 
making changes in two ways: [the] first is comprehensive rationality, and [the] 
second, bounded rationality.”23 In comprehensive rationality, the would-be 
terrorist is assumed to have a utility function that consistently ranks all the 
alternatives an individual faces and chooses the alternative that achieves the 
highest utility. Against the backdrop of this, it would not be wrong to conclude 
that comprehensive rationality works best with Expected Utility Theory, which is 
based on a final outcome in the shape of maximizing benefits.  
On the other hand, bounded rationality recognizes the inescapable 
limitations of knowledge and the computational ability of the agent. According to 
Simon’s conclusion, “to understand and predict human behavior, we have to deal 
with the realities of human rationality, that is, with bounded rationality,”24 and thus 
human behavior can be linked with Prospect Theory, which differentiates 
                                            
23 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decisions: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (New York: Addison Wesley Educational Publishers, 1999), 20. 
24 Herbert A. Simon, “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political 
Science, The American Political Science Review 79, no. 2. (1985): 297. 
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between the decision making process of an individual in either the gains or 
losses frame.  In light of previous analysis, a would-be terrorist, though aware of 
adopting a risky path, goes for it; since despite being rational, he is in the losses 
frame and risk acceptant.  
To overcome one of the shortfalls of Prospect Theory, i.e., to assess how 
people locate themselves either in the losses or gains frame, may require an 
initial reference point. According to Mercer, such reference points can be status 
quo, aspirations, heuristics, analogies and emotions.25  Essentially, for a person 
to be in the losses or gains frame, he may measure himself in relation to a 
reference point. For status quo, Mercer explains, “When we are satisfied with the 
status quo, we tend to be in domain of gain; when we are dissatisfied, we tend to 
be in domain of loss. Because, satisfaction is subjective and because no general 
theory of satisfaction exists.”26 With regard to aspirations, they give meaning to 
the individual’s perceived place in the future. If he falls short of his objective in 
life, and ultimately loses hope, then he lands himself in the losses frame.  
For analogies, Mercer quotes McDermott, who suggests that “historical 
analogies can provide powerful references for the development of frames;”27 
therefore, if an individual is affected or cares for past negative experiences, 
either personal or communal, he will perceive himself to be in the losses frame. 
Emotions (greed, self-interest, fear, anger, regret, pride, panic, desperation, 
trust)28 may explain why an individual is in the losses frame. A would-be 
terrorist’s feelings can cause him to reprioritize his choices, which may change 
according to his emotions. Therefore, as Mercer writes, “Emotion is not merely a 
consequence of a frame but can be a source of framing.”29 Heuristics explain 
how people interpret their environment and locate themselves in the domain of 
                                            
25 Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” 4. 
26 Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” 4.  
27 Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” 9.  
28 Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” 10.  
29 Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” 10.  
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losses or gains; thus, an individual’s preference will change with the changing 
circumstances. New options or conditions may put a would-be terrorist in either 
the losses or gains frame, but more importantly, will also help in transferring him 
from the losses to the gains frame.   
According to Jonathan Mercer, “we hate to lose more than we love to win, 
and so [we] will take more risk to avoid a loss than we will to secure an 
equivalent gain, is [sic] the basis for prospect theory.”30 According to Prospect 
Theory, there is a phenomenon of mirror image effects on the decision making 
process of an individual, which highlights the importance of narrative and the 
communication mechanism. The mirror image as explained by Kahneman and 
Tversky demonstrates how people in the gains frame prefer even sure smaller 
profits, compared to people in the losses frame, who instead of avoiding or 
minimizing the losses, opt for a more risky venture and decide on making a 
choice which leads towards potentially higher losses. This observation leads to a 
question: Is it the losses frame which affects this decision, or is it the framing or 
communication which explains the risky behavior? The answer to this can be 
“both,” since the losses frame precipitates taking more risk; whereas, the 
narrative helps in framing the decision making process in such a manner that it 
puts an individual in the losses frame right from the start.  
But, is it possible that a would-be terrorist will be in the losses frame 
despite the absence of a narrative? In this regard, individual perceptions play an 
important part because even when an individual only perceives himself to be in 
the losses frame, he may become risk acceptant. Therefore, it can be said that 
there will be certain kinds of would-be terrorists who, despite the absence of a 
narrative and communication, adopt the path of terrorism because they are in a 
losses frame due to personal circumstances, which could be completely removed 
from their mainstream narratives. This thesis will explain through examples that 
narrative is not the only variable that places people in the losses frame; however, 
                                            
30 Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” 17.  
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it has major significance. The same point was stressed by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 
a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2005. He writes “that we are in a battle, and 
that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.”31 
Also, in the words of John Arquilla, “The battle of the story is more than half of 
the battle.”32  
In the field of social sciences, Prospect Theory until now has been applied 
to decision making by state leaders in international affairs, focusing on exploring 
the individual aspects of the decision making processes under risk. This seems 
to be the application of Prospect Theory in the strategic decision making 
processes; whereas, this thesis applies it at the most basic level, i.e., individual 
decision making under the influence of losses and risk. Personal decision making 
highlights the internal as well as external factors associated with decision making 
under risk. In the case of terrorism, a would-be terrorist might be under the 
influence of his peers, his society, his religious or nationalistic values. Certainly 
there are external, as well as internal, factors that put an individual in the losses 
frame, causing him to adopt a more dangerous path. In order to validate this 
theory, the next chapter deals with terrorists’ memoirs and comes up with causes 
for being in the losses frame in more practical terms.   
                                            
31 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “English Translation of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Letter to Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi,” The Weekly Standard, (2005), accessed November 26, 2013, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/203gpuul.asp. 
32 John Arquilla, “Terrorist Information Operations and Networking” (lecture, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 16, 2012). 
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III. CAUSES OF BEING IN THE LOSSES FRAME 
While nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer; nothing is 
more difficult than to understand him. 
 –Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky 
 
Loss is both a subjective as well as objective phenomenon, and it will 
differ from individual to individual. For some people, losing material things may 
not be as important as losing intangible and incomprehensible things like 
ideology or identity, and, therefore, defining loss in particular terms is not an easy 
task. Its meanings will differ based on circumstances, narratives and 
communications. Religion, sacred values and spiritual beliefs affect how people 
value and interpret loss, and the same has been explained by Christopher G. 
Davis and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema who quote Dull and Skokan, “One important 
function played by religion is to provide a comforting explanation for events that 
cannot otherwise be explained.”33   
Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema write, “Coping with loss is a dynamic process 
that evolves overtime;”34 therefore, religion will not always be the only factor 
aiding in coping with the loss. Different individuals from different societies and 
cultures deal with loss in various ways. Sometimes the idea of being in the losses 
frame may divert people towards either a right or wrong path. For example, in the 
realm of the negative side, the process of adjusting to the loss of a loved one 
may turn one into a social loner, or cause a violent person to react against those 
whom he feels did not provide good medical care to the loved one. In the positive 
domain, one might choose to become a teacher, social worker, or a 
philanthropist.  
                                            
33 Christopher G. Davis and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, “Loss and meaning: How do people 
make sense of loss?,” The American Behavioral Scientist 44, no.5 (2001): 731.  
34 Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema, “Loss and meaning: How do people make sense of loss?” 
726.  
 20 
The emergence of different types of terrorism and different types of 
individuals as terrorists has also introduced different factors and reasons why 
individuals may resort to terrorism. In order to speculate about an individual in 
the losses frame, this thesis will focus on four specific categories: psychology, 
environment, ideology and biology. The psychological category will focus solely 
on the reasons which can be attributed to the personality traits of an individual: 
emotions, personality type, idealistic or realistic viewpoint, childhood traumas, 
etc. The environmental category will encompass the physical environment and 
circumstances that place people in the losses frame; the ideological category will 
look into the issues related to identity, both political as well as religious, personal 
beliefs, ethnic diversification and sacred values. In the final category of biology, 
the focus will be on issues related to adolescence, proving one’s worth in a 
society, even through violence, and imitating elders, regardless of whether they 
are right or wrong. These four categories and their related fields have been 
summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1.   Reasons for Being in the Losses Frame 
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The human decision-making process is under the influence of internal as 
well as external factors, and both internal and external factors weigh differently 
from individual to individual. Therefore, by analyzing the four categories in Table 
1, this thesis will attempt to answer the important questions: why do people in the 
losses frame behave differently, or, specifically, why do some join the path of 
terrorism and others do not? The answer to this question lies in the fact that 
people may be in the losses frame purely due to an actual reason, or due to 
some perceived grievances. These reasons could be due to some reference 
points35 such as grievances in the context of status quo, lack of equal 
opportunities in the category of aspirations, life experiences in the category of 
emotions, and historical enmity due wrong analogies. However, young people, 
motivated by a chic trend or promotion of a narrative by the elites, are more likely 
to assert their losses frame through actual risk acceptant behavior because of 
adolescence and its related high testosterone levels.  
A. PSYCHOLOGY 
Human psychology affects mental functions and behaviors, so 
understanding an individual’s psychology lead us towards understanding the 
reasons for being in a losses frame. The losses frame is related to an individual’s 
perception of events, cognition of environment, emotions towards others, 
motivation for actions, personality in general and behavior as a consequence of 
interpersonal relationships.  James Forest mentions, “In many cases, acts of 
terrorism carried out by individuals are the results of hatred towards others, along 
with a willingness and ability to kill without remorse.”36 This hatred and 
willingness may be because those individuals have a perception of being 
exploited by others, be they corrupt governments, Western society or elites, and 
                                            
35 Mercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science,” 4. 
36 James J. F. Forest, “Exploring Root Causes of Terrorism: An Introduction,” in The Making 
of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes Volume One, ed. James J. F. Forest 
(London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 3.  
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ultimately this perception may lead those individuals to look for other solutions, 
including adopting terrorism to address their grievances.  
Strong emotions like anger, rage, grief, hate, emptiness, etc., may cause a 
would-be terrorist to behave out of character. The causes of such strong 
emotions could be triggered by childhood trauma, absence of a father figure in 
early life, or frequent life transitions. In this regard, Adam Yahiye Gadahn, an 
American and a senior al-Qaeda operative, is a case in point.  While explaining 
his early childhood reflections, he writes that one of the causes for his moving 
towards radical Islam was a “yawning emptiness” in his life and a “strained 
relationship” with his parents.37 In another case, specifically with regard to 
criminals, the famous Indian Bandit Queen Phoolan Devi offers that she was put 
into the losses frame due to her early life traumas in the form of rape, torture and 
subsequent humiliation, suffered at the hands of an elite class in a male-
dominated, class conscious society.38  
Early childhood trauma may be the reason for a person to feel hate, 
anger, revenge, anxiety or emptiness, and he may express those feelings 
outwardly in the shape of risk acceptant behavior in the future. Consider the early 
life trauma faced by Mosab Hassan Yousef. He had to face the embarrassment 
of looking for food from dumpsters, once his uncle ridiculed him for selling 
homemade food in the market. He writes, “Tears came into my mother’s eyes. … 
I was angry. I didn’t understand why our neighbors and family would not help us. 
And on top of that, they had the nerve to judge us for trying to help ourselves."39  
                                            
37 Adam Yahiye Gadahn, “Yahiye Adam Gadahn’s Conversion Story,” Islamic Network 
(January 1, 2006), accessed Jul 28, 2013, http://www.islamicnetwork.com/index.php/ 
weblog/comments/yahiye_adam_gadahns _conversion _story/.  
38 John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare have 
Shaped Our World (Landam, MD, The Rowman and Littlefield Publication Group, 2011), 241–
252. 
39 Mosab Hassan Yousef, with Ron Brackin, Son of Hamas: A Gripping Account of Terror, 
Betrayal, Political Intrigue, and Unthinkable Choices (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House 
Publishers,, 2010), 37. 
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If an individual is singled out by society as a consequence of failures in his 
life, he may look for other means or reasons for apportioning the blame of his 
own inadequacies. According to Jerrold Post, “Unable to face his own 
inadequacies, the individual with his personality style needs a target to blame 
and attack for his own inner weakness and inadequacies.”40 Such inadequacies, 
if blown out of proportion, may result in putting people into a losses frame. The 
intriguing case of the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik is a case in 
point, where apart from being an alienated individual and experiencing a 
turbulent early life without the supervision of his father, he had not been 
successful in his early education, in relationships, in business or in his efforts to 
inspire people politically.41 These failures once applied collectively were enough 
to put him into the losses frame and bring about the resultant risky behavior 
revealed in the shape of terrorist attacks.  
The individual personality also plays an important role in defining the 
domain of a person, i.e. if a person is an introvert like Anders Breivik, he is likely 
to end up in the losses frame; whereas, an extroverted person may have external 
reasons for being in the losses frame, like needing to prove one’s worth in the 
eyes of his peers or elders. The early life of Osama bin Laden is an example. In 
order to gain the attention of his father, bin Laden had to go beyond established 
norms, and this behavior later in his life led him to challenge the established 
international norms as well.42 Therefore, no single type of personality can be 
associated with the losses frame; rather an individual personality may be 
dependent on the external variable(s) to transform it into a perceived losses or 
gains frames.   
                                            
40 Jerrold M. Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of 
Political Behavior (London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 129.  
41 Alexandra Bech Gjørv et al. Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen (Oslo: Departementenes 
servicesenter Informasjonsforvaltning, 2012),  Chapter 15.4, accessed September 30, 2013, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37994796/PDFS/NOU201220120014000DDDPDFS.pdf. 
42 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2007), 84. 
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The idealism of an individual correlates to a tendency whereby a person 
“follows no path besides his own. He trusts himself and his opinions regardless of 
what society believes.”43 This suggests that if an individual is in direct 
confrontation with society, he may be in the losses frame. The best examples of 
this concept are eco-terrorists who, despite knowing that society does not 
support their stance, resort to violence to further their viewpoint. Here, it does not 
mean that society explicitly is in favor of destroying the environment; however, 
society is giving implicit permission to do so by not overtly opposing such actions. 
Another psychological condition relates to the plight of others. In this 
instance, an individual blames himself for not helping others, or at least not 
raising his voice against the aggressors. This gains added importance once that 
individual not only juxtaposes the plight of the others against his own privileged 
life, but also compares it with the lives of the people from the society of the 
aggressors. In this regard, narratives, communications and the role of media gain 
prominence, as can be witnessed by the Palestinian video of Muhammad and 
Jamal44 seen cowering behind a concrete block, where they were caught 
between the firefight. This amplifies the adage, “a picture speaks a thousand 
words.” According to Harriet Sherwood, “It [the video] was reproduced on 
posters, stamps, and murals across the Arab world and cited by al-Qaeda in the 




                                            
43 “Idealism in Individualism,” School Bytes, accessed Aug 2, 2013, http://www.schoolbytes. 
com/papers/summary.php?disp=term&id=141.  
44 Al-Dura. “The Birth of An Icon,” YouTube video, accessed July 7, 2013, 
http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=DzsCBFhCsyY.  
45 Harriet Sherwood, “Father of Muhammad al-Dura rebukes Israeli report on son’s death,” 




At times we are victims of our own milieu. 
 –Ed Husain 
 
The Reasons category of Environment in Table 1 gives a broad overview 
of geographical, environmental, cultural, social and visual effects related to 
individuals’ or would-be terrorists’ life conditions vis-à-vis their surroundings. 
However, if an individual is living in an environment of conflict with a lack of both 
physical and mental security, or without any hope for his or her future, that 
individual will not always show risky behavior. This variance may be attributed to 
the external costs of the environmental conditions on the decision making 
processes. If an individual considers himself in a losses frame, he will look for 
other solutions, which may be beyond the established norms, in order to acquire 
a sense of purpose and belonging. These solutions may offer him more security 
and economic benefits, in addition to the fulfillment of his psychological need for 
a sense of self-worth and respect from his family and peers.  
Geography can also play an important role in affecting the decision-
making process of whether an individual places himself or herself in either the 
losses or gains frame. This phenomenon holds true both for the physical aspects 
of geography like type of terrain and location, as well as the geographical 
aspects of psychology like nationhood, culture and religion. According to John 
Rock, “a geographic ontology—would include things such as mountains, rivers, 
and streams, or perhaps cities, buildings and more abstract things like nations 
and their boundaries.”46  Therefore, the mere presence of an individual in an area 
full of conflicts on territorial, ethnic, religious or cultural grounds, coupled with the 
rugged terrain, may preordain an individual in the losses frame. In this regard, 
Afghanistan is a classic case in point where both the physical as well as the 
                                            
46 John C. Rock, “The Geographic Nature of Terrorism,” University of Buffalo, accessed Jul 
10, 2013, www.ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/courses0 /papers/Rock( eo .pdf .  
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mental geographical traits that place people in the losses frame are in 
abundance.  
In the case of Palestine, an area already in the clutches of regional 
conflicts, the introduction of Jewish immigrants, who migrated to the Palestinian 
territories in the nineteenth century, further disturbed the balance of power. The 
creation of a state of Israel without creating a comparable state for the 
Palestinians further exacerbated the problem. This point has also been raised by 
Mosab Hassan Yousef, who writes:  
Israel became a state in 1948. However, the Palestinian territories 
remained just that—non sovereign territories. Without a constitution 
to maintain some semblance of order, religious law becomes the 
highest authority. And when everyone is free to interpret and 
enforce the law as he sees fit, chaos ensues.47  
The ensuing chaos was fully utilized by the power brokers, who in order to 
achieve their own interests, used religion to reap profits out of this chaos. 
Apart from forced settlements or migrations, the risk acceptant behavior 
problem can also be observed amongst migrant communities which have moved 
from the developing to the developed world. The negative behavior of such 
communities could be attributed both to the marginalization of immigrant 
populations as consequences of the socio-economic nature of Western societies, 
as well as the deep entrenchment in their erstwhile home cultures. Sociologist 
Zygmunt Bauman emphasizes that “’migrants’ moving to countries where 
modernity was born and has become established, often find themselves in a 
paradoxical situation with no way out.”48 Ed Husain fully explains this paradox in 
his memoirs, “My parents were strong believers in single sex education,”49 and 
once he started to attend an all-male school, he noticed that “looking around me, 
                                            
47 Yousef with Brackin, Son of Hamas, xv.  
48 Armando Spataro, “Why do People become Terrorists?,” Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 6 no.3 (2008).  
49 Ed Husain, The Islamist: Why I Became an Islamic Fundamentalist, What I Saw Inside, 
and Why I Left (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 5.  
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I wished I was back at Sir William’s. At Sir William’s my classmates included 
Jane, Lisa, Andrew, Mark, Alia, Zak. Here everyone was Bangladeshi, Muslim 
and male.”50 
The dilemma explained in the previous paragraph not only highlights the 
physical geography, but also crosses into the more abstract social, cultural and 
religious domains. While parents from the developing world have their native 
country’s mindset, the new generation raised in the developed world is more 
open to modern and futuristic trends, thereby putting them in two frames of mind 
at the same time. This problem starts in early childhood as Western education 
institutions try to steer a child in one direction, while at home, the same child’s 
parents pull him or her in an altogether different direction. This paradox is 
probably one of the leading causes why immigrants perceive themselves in the 
losses frame and can be clearly seen in the life of Ed Husain. If immigrant 
families refuse to accept the new culture, they will be alienated from the 
mainstream society; on the other hand, if they accept the new norms, they will be 
seen as the traitors to their own cultures. 
Moreover, immigrants are also subject to racial and ethnic slurs by the 
native population. This becomes a significant concern for immigrants who, 
according to Armando Spataro, are trying “to search for a feeling of belonging to 
a community.”51 Consequently, this racism puts people in the losses frame 
where, in order to gain respect not only amongst their native community but also 
amongst their adopted one, they become susceptible to taking unnecessary 
risks. This paradox also leads a would-be terrorist into the folds of his perceived 
friends, who are only interested in taking advantage of the situation for their own 
cause. Armando Spataro quotes a collaborating terrorist talking about his 
recruiter, “He would call me brother, and everyone understood that I was his 
friend and that I too had to be respected.”52 According to Jerrold Post, “The 
                                            
50 Husain, The Islamist, 6.  
51 Spataro, “Why do People become Terrorists?”  
52 Spataro, “Why do People become Terrorists?” 
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network of friendships was the main determinant of whether the youth ended up 
in a terrorist group, a youth gang, or the drug culture;”53 therefore, by being an 
outcast, the individual is already in the losses frame and an ideal recruit for both 
terrorist and criminal organizations.  
Culture and its associated norms and values play an important role in 
putting people in the losses frame. According to U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
Counterinsurgency Manual 3-24, “Social structures comprise relationship among 
groups, institutions, and individuals within a society; in contrast, culture (ideas, 
norms, rituals, codes of behavior) provides meaning to individual within 
societies.”54 Even in the modern nation-state, it is difficult to accept that there is 
only one culture other than the dominant one. Ideally, there should be some 
tolerance to different cultural norms, ideas, and values; however, once the 
situation becomes contrary, this lack of tolerance may put people into the losses 
frame. Such prejudices are not common to Western societies only, but exist also 
in the Muslim countries like Pakistan, where Madrassah graduates are 
discriminated against due to their appearance and dress, making them an 
outcast from the mainstream society, and thus ideal recruits for terrorist 
organizations.  
Prevailing trends also impact people, as individuals naturally are more 
inclined to join the caravan of winners, even if only by riding the bandwagon. 
During the 1980s, the Jihadi culture was romanticized through heroic tales of the 
Mujahideen, who wreaked havoc upon a superpower, the USSR. Despite the end 
of the Afghan Jihad, this trend continued either due to the apathy of the world in 
general, or the rise of more pressing issues than the one of Jihad in particular. 
Left unattended, the trend gained momentum, especially in the conflict areas 
where people thought it to be the most profitable profession, offering both power 
and mystique, and ultimately led them to think of it in terms of gains, rather than 
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losses. This explanation highlights why people even in the gains frame can be 
drawn towards a wrong path.  
Eventually, the world realized the dangers of this trend; the quick-fix 
solution was to forcefully suppress these extremist and violent ideas, which 
automatically transferred those people from a gains frame into a losses frame. 
The temporary gains frame may have been a result of acceptable norms and 
trends of the time; however, once the physical as well ideological circumstances 
changed, individuals who had thought themselves to be in the gains frame 
moved into the losses frame by default. Such individuals lost hope in their ability 
or perceived ability to shape a future, thought themselves to be at the mercy of 
the merciless, unable to choose independently, and without their freedom. A PKK 
terrorist mentions the need for freedom by saying, “Freedom is the reason I live 
really, and freedom to me is living my culture, speaking my native language and 
sharing it with others, openly. Until now I thought I was devoid of this freedom 
and with this perception, I joined the PKK.”55 
Because of the saturation of information from technological advances, 
newer generations in the developing world are more aware of global trends, 
which has led them to start comparing their lives with those living in the most 
advanced and developed countries. Consequently, living in an inferior 
environment places them into the losses frame. Moreover, today’s generation is 
more focused on the future, seeking the best in their lives, and once they feel 
that these opportunities are either not available or denied to them, the end result 
is the losses frame. This lack of opportunity for a better future, once combined 
with an environment charged with anti-West and anti-U.S. sentiments, leads such 
individuals towards the risky path of terrorism.  
Economic deprivation is yet another factor which puts people in a losses 
frame, and, therefore, economic openness is essential. Yet one school of thought 
argues that terrorism is not caused by poverty. As Alan B. Krueger and Jitka 
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Maleckova posit, “There is little direct connection between poverty, education, 
and participation in or support for terrorism.”56 Indeed, many terrorists come from 
relatively well-off families, but simply rejecting the idea that economic deprivation 
plays no role in putting people in the losses frame may not be prudent. A Turkish 
leftist, DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front  terrorist highlights 
this phenomenon of economic disparity when he writes, “my weakest point was 
that my economic circumstances were not good. They … exploited it. … They 
approached me with warmth that I later understood to be false.”57 
C. IDEOLOGY 
Ideology is an abstract thought process, concept or an idea, which can be 
normative or descriptive, as well as political, national or religious. When it comes 
to terrorism, ideology deeply matters because it is the main component of 
terrorist acts and thus may become the leading cause of putting people in the 
losses frame. Ideology provides individuals with the necessary tools to align their 
personal grievances with a greater cause, lets them identify the enemy and find a 
solution. If looked at through the lens of economic preference, ideology may not 
make any sense, as has been asserted by Alan Kruger who writes that “we tend 
to see the world through materialistic Western eyes, viewing economic 
circumstances as powerful motivators for belief and action.”58 The current wave 
of terrorism is not always about material losses or gains, or geo-political 
grievances; there are other ideological factors that put people in the losses 
frame. 
In the realm of ideology, the problem may be political, as in the case of 
ethnic, religious or economic terrorism, or possibly environmental as can be seen 
in eco-terrorism. The economic factor can be witnessed in the leftist class 
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struggle between socialism and capitalism; whereas, when it comes to eco 
terrorism, Stefan H. Leader and Peter Probst list two causes as the grievances of 
eco-terrorists: biocentrism and deep ecology. According to them:  
Biocentrism is the belief that all organisms on earth are equal and 
deserving of moral rights and considerations … [Whereas] 
believers in deep ecology favor a rollback  
of industrialization/civilization … [for] preservation of the 
environment. 59 
Consequently, if an individual sees the environment in danger, through the 
extinction of species and other reasons such as industrialization or urbanization, 
these factors may put him in the losses frame if he feels that by doing nothing, he 
is harming the environment himself. A spokesman for the eco-terrorist 
organization Earth Liberation Front (ELF), Craig Rosebraugh, says, “All power to 
the people. Long live the earth liberation front. Long live the animal liberation 
front. Long live all the sparks attempting to ignite the revolution. Sooner or later 
the sparks will turn to flame!”60 According to Jennifer Horton:  
The Earth Liberation Front, or ELF, was formed when some 
members of the group Earth First! became frustrated … and began 
a group that would engage in more violent, direct action. Like the 
members of ELF, eco-terrorists are radical environmentalists who 
believe traditional ways of bringing about change are not 
adequate.61 
In ideology, religious language and ideas play an important part. Different 
reasons such as loss of identity, culture or some territory may be transformed by 
religion, as in the case of Palestine, where the territorial issue adopted the color 
of religious confrontation between the Muslims and the Jews. With regard to the 
loss of culture, the example of Syed Qutb, one of the founding fathers of al-
Qaeda, is a classic case in point. He thought that the West was trying to impose 
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their materialistic culture upon Egypt in order to corrupt it, and thus it was the 
duty of every true believer to resist that in earnest.62 In the end, that duty adopted 
a religious color as well. Against this backdrop, Robert A. Pape describes this 
trend as, “a defense of territory or culture that is perceived to be under [threat or] 
control of an outside power.”63 The frustration and desperation of being under the 
occupation of an outside power, leading to loss of identity, may put an individual 
in the losses frame.  
The next factor which puts people into a losses frame may be loss of 
identity, be it ethnic, religious, cultural or political identity. According to Ivan 
Sijakovic, “An individual … go[es] through the process of identifying with an idea, 
value, attitudes, or acts. That is how the process of acquiring and preserving 
collective identity begins.”64 This assertion by Sijakovic suggests that identities 
can be personal as well as communal. With regards to religious identity, Anna 
Simons writes that it serves in “joining people together across lineages, tribes, 
and all sorts of boundaries that otherwise still fracture the non-west.”65 Ideas like 
Us against Them, East versus West, Clash of Civilizations or Holy War and 
Crusade, will place those individuals who see themselves losing their identities in 
a losses frame. According to Ivan Sijakovic, “The process of acquiring collective 
identity (collective formation of identity) begins through the attitudes, “we” and 
“they.”66  
For ethnic identity, Daniel Byman writes, “Perceived discrimination along 
economic, political, or cultural lines can trigger tremendous resentment and 
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cause ethnic terrorism.67 This is why ethnic terrorist groups begin the struggle by 
strengthening ethnic identity. By saying that one has a different identity, because 
he or she is from a different region, tribe, sect, family or even a state, ethnic or 
terrorist group tries to place individuals into the losses frame through their 
perceived identities. To solve such a problem, Amish people in the U.S. isolate 
themselves physically from the larger society and purposefully and carefully 
forego most modern conveniences. They assiduously avoid or control threats to 
their communal identity.68  
This dilemma of identity becomes even more critical for immigrant 
communities living in the West, who either by trying to preserve their identity, or 
to avoid discrimination, hoard themselves into immigrants’ pockets or islands in 
big metropolises. By isolating themselves, they are already in the losses frame, 
since they perceive the larger society as an outsider, and the same trends are 
then exploited by terrorist organizations in order to recruit people from such 
pockets. A classic case in point is the famous Hamburg Cell, which played a 
critical role in the 9/   terrorist attacks. According to John Miller, “They lived 
together, worshipped at the same mosque, and discussed topics like 
bombmaking [sic] and chemical weapons.”69 
There could also be a loss of political identity which may put people in the 
losses frame: examples include leftist and rightist movements in which people 
have resorted to violence as a means of raising their voices. In this regard, 
rightist groups may include people like Anders Breivik, who based upon his on 
the opposition to immigrants, perceived himself to be in a losses frame and 
ultimately took risks by conducting terrorist attacks. On the other side of political 
divide, there are leftists who view the governments they oppose as authoritarian, 
exploitive and corrupt, and emphasize idealism and anti-imperialism. Their 
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ideology is heavily influenced by Marxist and other communist and socialist 
thought. The Red Brigade, Red Army Faction (RAF) in Europe, Shining Path and 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia are examples of such ideology-
based groups. According to Assaf Moghadam, RAF’s ideology saw the Federal 
Republic of  ermany as “fascist,” and a continuation of the former Nazi rule.70 
There can be two aspects with regard to loss of identity: self-revelation by 
the individual stemming from his upbringing, or external influence in the shape of 
some motivation, either due to group or peer pressure, some grievance, or the 
plight of others. Ed Husain quotes a friend who observed that “Partial Muslims 
like our parents will never understand what we are trying to do. Be patient, 
brother. You are from among the true Muslims.”71 This reflects both the internal 
as well as external impact of being in the losses frame, since Ed Husain, due to 
pressure from his parents, had to find a way out, which ultimately led him into the 
folds of extremist organization, “Hizb ut-Tahrir.”  This point has also been raised 
by Scott Atran, who writes, “It’s no accident that nearly all religious and political 
movements express allegiance through the idiom of family—brothers and sisters, 
children of  od, fatherland, motherland, homeland.”72  
There is a constant competition going on between the West and the East 
on the superiority of their origins and cultures. This phenomenon was fully 
showcased by Edward Said, who, while discussing Orientalism, explained it in 
full detail. According to him, “European culture gained in strength and identity by 
setting itself off against the Orient [East] as a sort of surrogate and even 
underground self.”73 He further explains that “Orientalism depends for its strategy 
on this flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a … relatively 
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upper hand.”74  The same concept is still present, though to a lesser degree, and 
is being exploited by terrorist organizations in furthering their agendas against 
the West. The same concept has been highlighted by Anna Simons, who writes 
that “This issue of submission and moral superiority represents the crux of the 
struggle between Islamists and the west.”75 If the individual thinks of himself as 
being inferior and coerced to accept Western values, he will already be in the 
losses frame, because irrespective of reality, nobody wants to see himself or 
herself as inferior to others.  
Narratives, especially ones involving a historical context, play a crucial 
role in putting people in the losses frame, since they are always present at the 
subconscious level of mind. Such narratives, whether fabricated or established, 
after continuous repetition over a period of time are likely to become the only 
truth. Ed Husain cites a Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, which states that “The only meeting 
place between a Muslim and a Jew is the battlefield.”76 He also mentions a 
sticker quoting Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that 
reads, “Allah is Our Lord. Muhammad is Our Leader. The Koran is Our 
Constitution. Jihad is Our Way. Martyrdom is Our Desire.”77 These narratives, 
once played by both sides in a historical context similar to the Crusades or Jihad, 
are sufficient enablers to put an ordinary individual in the losses frame.  
Analogies from texts which are sacred for an individual can also put him in 
a losses frame. During the first Gulf War, the narrative used by Osama bin Laden 
with reference to Saudi Arabia was that “It was the Saudi government that had 
invited the kafir U.S. soldiers to the Holy Land,”78 and in this regard, an analogy 
is drawn from the Quranic edict that states, “O ye who believe! surely, the 
idolaters are unclean. So they shall not approach the Sacred Mosque after this 
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year of theirs.” 79 Although this Quranic verse relates to the Holy Mosque of 
Kaaba, this concept was applied generally to all of Saudi Arabia and was raised 
to entice Muslims Ummah to gain sympathy for the terrorist cause. In such 
circumstances, the elites, furthering their own agendas, utilize and exploit these 
narratives loaded with history and analogy, give meaning to the grievances of the 
masses and thereby place even the society in the losses frame. In his book, 
Mommy I’m Home: Homecoming of a Suicide Bomber, Serdar Bayraktutan 
quotes a leading PKK recruiter saying:  
I believe PKK is not there for the Kurdish people, but they are for 
some external powers who want to reign in the Middle East. 
Weapon traders and drug smugglers want to continue with 
terrorism, because they do not want their trade to stop.80  
The role of elites could be explicit as well as implicit, and the elites 
category can be extended to personal relations like father, mother or some elder 
in the family—a phenomenon more pronounced in the Eastern cultures. Although 
Ed Husain was  6 years old, his father’s and  randpa’s interest in current affairs 
affected his ways of thinking and his behaviors towards the global geo-political 
environment. He writes, “Before my sixteenth birthday my father’s interest in 
current affairs and  randpa’s delegation of news monitoring to me meant that I 
had become politicized.”81 This was an implicit if not explicit influence of elites 
from their religious perspectives, because after this period, Ed Husain started to 
look at current events through a religious prism.  
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D. BIOLOGY  
A young boy’s company determines his destiny. 
 –Eastern proverb 
 
The biology category will specifically focus on the factors related to 
childhood, the pressures of adolescence and related problems of boredom, 
inquisitiveness to be part of some group, making a mark on the society in general 
and family elders in particular, i.e., proving one’s worth, and following the 
prevalent trends in a society. This section will explore the impact of these factors 
in putting individuals in a losses frame both from a personal as well as a group 
perspective. The personal side will focus more on the psychological aspects of 
early childhood, whereas, the group perspective focuses on the external factors 
leading people to place themselves in the losses frame.  
The personal aspect includes a loss of pride resulting from a violent past, 
either due to group discrimination or domestic violence that may put youngsters 
in the losses frame. In order to alleviate their miseries, such individuals are more 
likely to resort to violence themselves as an expression of their hatred towards 
others. The example of the Indian Bandit Queen Phoolan Devi fully personifies 
this phenomenon. During her early childhood, she was subjected to physical as 
well as mental torture: she was raped as well as beaten for raising her voice 
against the atrocities of her paternal male cousin.82 This dilemma has been 
captured by Mark Juergensmeyer who writes that “men … who experienced this 
loss of pride and identity would lash out in violence—the way that men often do 
when they are frustrated. Such expressions of power are meant to at least 
symbolically regain their sense of manhood.”83  
However, this raises a question: Is this phenomenon only common in 
youngsters, or could it occur in later life as well? The answer to this could be 
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“both.” It may occur in youngsters as well as adults who experience a trauma and 
who use violence to express their frustration and anger, as was the case with 
Ayman al Zawahiri, who became fully radicalized after being subjected to 
physical torture during his prison term.84 Ed Husain also highlights an early 
childhood trauma of racial discrimination. As a six-year-old, Ed Husain was 
taunted by cries of “Pakis! Pakis! F— off back home!”85 After which Ed Husain 
began to question his identity and where he belonged. He recounts facing 
religiously offensive language from his teacher, who based the charges of 
missing an obligation, tried to ridicule him by asking, “Where is your Allah now 
then, eh? Where is he? Can’t he help you?”86 He further writes that “This mixed 
heritage of being British by birth, Asian by descent, and Muslim by conviction 
was set to tear me apart in later life.”87  
Youngsters are most vulnerable to outside influence, whether from their 
elders, teachers or even peers. This becomes a grave problem once they are 
away from their loved ones. A youngster has psychological needs: he needs to 
be loved, given appropriate respect and trust, and if he does not get either, owing 
to being neglected by parents or being away from the family, he is likely to put 
himself in a losses frame. It then will become easier to influence such an 
individual towards hate, revenge and violence. A PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) 
terrorist tells in his memoirs that:  
I started to attend the university. I was very happy but I was away 
from my home town and family. I wanted to finish my education … 
During the university, I met with new friends who were from my 
home town and were my seniors. Because of their influence, I 
started to become somebody else, filled with revenge and hate, and 
separatist ideas. I had no power to say stop, I was afraid, I was 
alone in the big city: Istanbul.88  
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Adolescence is a time when youngsters start to question the goals of their 
lives, and anything new, trendy or dangerous may seem attractive. Ed Husain 
comments, “I was sixteen years old and I had no white friends … This was my 
Britain. Against this backdrop, the writings of Sarwar’s guru, Mawdudi, took me to 
a radically new level.”89 Moreover high testosterone levels also influence an 
individual’s behavior during his teen years, and he will show resistance to the 
established norms, thereby making him more aggressive and action hungry. With 
this idea in mind, the youngster will be more inclined to accept the fact that it is 
always better to stand and do something, whether right or wrong, than to remain 
passive. Ed Husain reminisces over his younger years, “We were taught never 
defend, always offend.”90 
Such biological tendencies can also be influenced by external 
circumstances, such as the plight of others, economic or social grievances, etc. 
Ed Husain explains this dilemma by citing the example of the Balkan Crisis in the 
1990s. He writes, “The Balkan crisis truly radicalized many Muslims in Britain. I 
desperately wanted to help, to do something to stop the killing. And we were 
young; we believed we could change the world.”91 Another example is from 
Palestine, where after stoning Israel Defense Forces (IDF) vehicles, Hassan 
Yousef mentions that, “my friends and I had challenged the might of the Israeli 
arm and come out unscathed. The rush was addictive, making us even bolder.”92 
Another implied element leading from the biological factor is that once 
youngsters become involved in criminal activity for different reasons, they likely 
end up in prison. These prisons, according to a left wing Turkish terrorist from 
DEV-SOL (Revolutionary Left), are the main breading grounds of terrorism. He 
says, “It was like the terrorist organizations owned the prison. The dormitories 
were shared among the different organizations … In such an environment, they 
                                            
89 Bayraktutan, Anne Ben Geldim, 35.  
90 Bayraktutan, Anne Ben Geldim, 100.  
91 Bayraktutan, Anne Ben Geldim, 75,  
92 Yousef with Brackin, Son of Hamas, 23.  
 40 
were doing what they wanted. The prison was like an education center of 
[terrorist] organizations.”93 Under such circumstances, a youngster who is 
already in a miserable condition as a consequence of landing on the negative 
side of society is more prone to such advances, thereby putting him in the losses 
frame and making him further risk acceptant.  
Another psychological trait which may put people in the losses frame is 
the tendency of the young to imitate their elders, irrespective of right or wrong. 
This aspect is also related to cultural trends in a particular society, and thus has 
more significance in the Eastern as well as Muslim cultures, where as a rule, 
youngsters are encouraged to follow in the footsteps of their elders. In this 
regard, Mosab Hassan Yousef writes in his memoirs, “I desperately wanted to be 
like my father, just as he had wanted to be like his father.”94 Therefore, just the 
psychological urge of copying one’s parents or elders may put an individual in a 
losses frame. By contrast, individualism may also cause people to perceive 
themselves in the losses frame. 
In this chapter, by analyzing the reasons which put people in the losses 
frame under the four categories: psychology, environment, ideology and biology, 
the stage is set to move towards those measures which may move such 
individuals from the losses frame to a gains frame. However, it would be prudent 
to link these categories with empirics in the shape of memoirs, interrogation 
reports and governmental data on terrorist cross culturally, as well as from 
different economic and political backgrounds. This will help in quelling the 
impression that by giving a few examples in support of the theory, the same 
cannot be applied uniformly at the global level. Therefore, the next chapter 
focuses separately on each cause of being in the losses frame, and supports it 
with real life examples from different social, cultural, economic and political 
backgrounds. 
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IV. EMPIRICS FOR THE LOSSES FRAME 
We do not learn from experience...we learn from reflecting on 
experience.” 
 –John Dewey 
 
This thesis has argued that some people in a losses frame become more 
risk acceptant and may ultimately end up with terrorist organizations; however, to 
understand the human decision making process and why an individual adopts 
such a risky path, it will be important to examine examples from the pool of data 
on terrorists. The causes for being in the losses frame are different from 
individual to individual, as described in Chapter III; however, it can be argued that 
supporting examples for each reason could have been cherry-picked to support 
the theory adopted for this thesis. Therefore, in this chapter, all the 
aforementioned causes will be being pitted against terrorists’ memoirs, 
interrogation reports, and experts’ opinions to apply the losses frame component 
of Prospect Theory across the globe. The fact remains, it is extremely difficult to 
understand the complexities of the losses frame, especially at the lower levels. 
Even so, analyzing individuals from different social, economic and political 
backgrounds will demonstrate explicitly that there are certain causes which will 
drive would-be terrorists towards terrorism’s risky path.  
To study terrorists from varied backgrounds, all four categories—
psychology, environment, ideology, and biology—will be supported separately. In 
each category, examples will be given in support of Subcategories and at the end 
of the chapter, a conclusion will be drawn graphically, pointing towards certain 
causes for placement in the losses frame as more critical or important than the 
others. However, this thesis does not claim that these reasons or the data set of 
the terrorists are exhaustive, and the conclusions drawn at the end are solely be 
based on the reasons and data set of terrorists considered for this thesis. 
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A. PSYCHOLOGY 
This is the story of my journey from the inside, in the fullest sense 
of the word: inside today’s Islam, inside Britain’s Muslim 
communities, inside my own heart. 
 –Ed Husain 
1. Emotions and Trauma 
The impact of emotions and trauma in either early or later life compel 
some people, out of anger and frustration, to resort to the use of violence. These 
psychological outbursts can be observed in examples from the battlegrounds of 
Palestine to the most stable societies such as Norway and the U.S.; from the 
migrant communities in the West to the separatist multi-ethnic groups in the 
developing world. These examples also cover different time periods: from the 
leftist and fascist movements in post-World War II Europe, to the Islamic 
renaissance in the Middle East in the early and mid-twentieth century, to the 
present.  
From the Palestinian hotbed of violence, Mosab Hassan Yousef, son of 
Sheikh Hassan Yousef, one of the seven founders of the Hamas, writes about his 
childhood years: “When the Intifada started, everything changed at our cemetery-
playground. Every day, more bodies were arriving than ever before. Anger and 
rage stalked hand in hand with grief.”95 During his teen years, he further writes 
that after being caught for stoning vehicles, “The soldiers took my shoes and 
made me sit on the ground. I thought they were going to shoot me and leave my 
body in a field somewhere.”96  
As a result of this trauma, the only outcome for him, he believed, was to 
vent his frustrations through the use of violence against the perpetrators. Mosab 
writes, “I could think of nothing else except joining the military wing of Hamas and 
taking revenge on Israel. … Filled with anger and desire for revenge, I started 
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hunting for guns.”97 After being arrested and beaten by the Israelis, Mosab 
writes, “The fires of hatred burned inside me. I wanted revenge on the soldier 
who had beaten me so badly. I wanted revenge on Israel. I didn’t care about the 
cost, even if it cost me my life.”98 He further says, “I had never felt such pain. But 
worse than the physical pain was the horror of being at the mercy of something 
merciless, something raw and inhuman … I understood fighting and killing out of 
hatred, rage, revenge or even necessity.”99 
Another example from Palestine is of Leila Khaled, from the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who epitomizes the dilemma a youngster 
faces. Rex Hudson recounts her trauma by writing, “At age four … her family fled 
the Israeli occupation and lived in impoverished exile in a … refugee camp in 
Sour, Lebanon. By age eight, she had become politically aware of the Palestinian 
plight.”100 Since her youth was filled with traumas, ultimately she resorted to the 
use of violence to vent and avenge her anger on the Israelis, whom she thought 
were the prime reason for her losses.  
From the immigrant communities in Europe, Ed Husain explains his school 
years when he had to go to an all-boys school due to his parents’ insistence. He 
says, “Uncommitted, I continued to be loner at school, occasionally bullied, 
frequently sworn at, and regularly ignored in most classes. How I yearned to be 
back at Sir William Burroughs.”101 This forced change created a trauma for a 
young boy, who felt a misfit in the new environment and was guided eventually 
toward the wrong direction as a consequence of his immigrant status in a 
Western society.  
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In referencing the influence of early childhood trauma at home, Serdar 
Bayraktutan quotes Mustafa Duyar, a DHKP/C terrorist who, due to problems 
and violence at home, was also not able to adjust in his school. He mentions that 
“in school and in work life, I always saw myself as different from others, and I felt 
as a loser.”102 He further mentions that his mother was ultimately killed by his 
stepfather, and in order to avoid the pity of the people and be strong, he opted for 
risky behavior to prove his worth in the society.103  
Renato Curcio, imprisoned leader of the Italian Red Brigades, had very 
difficult times during his early years. His mother was a housemaid, and her 
“itinerant positions with families required long separations. In April  945, Curcio’s 
beloved uncle, Armando … was murdered in a fascist ambush. A poor student, 
Curcio failed several subjects in his first year of high school and had to repeat the 
year.”104 In this case the disturbed childhood years led to bad educational 
performance in the school years, and the final straw proved to be the murder of 
his uncle, which made his trauma more acute, and led him into the folds of 
violence.  
Another curious case is that of Anders Behring Breivik, who despite living 
in a highly developed and stable society, resorted to the use of violence, in part 
because his childhood and adolescence were troubled. A year after his birth, his 
parents separated and were formally divorced four years later. SSBU, Norway's 
Center for Child and Youth Psychiatry pointed out that caring for Breivik was 
failing to such a degree that he was in danger of developing more serious 
psychopathology. In addition, there was a suspicion of sexual harassment/abuse 
by his mother,105 which even if not completely true, could have produced a 
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lasting impact on him psychologically, leading him to take revenge on all of 
society for not protecting him.  
Another case of emotional trauma is that of the Oklahoma bomber, 
Timothy McVeigh, who was a child of a broken family. His parents separated 
when he was ten years old. While his sisters preferred to live with their mother, 
he stayed with his father. This seclusion from his mother and sisters molded his 
personality into that of a shy loner “who did not socialize much.”106 The 
experiences of early life led him to look for confidence in other things such as 
guns, which became a passion for him, and led him to use violence as a means 
to express himself. 
Aside from early life trauma, people facing traumatic situations in their 
adulthood can also be affected. Two cases which have come to prominence are 
those of Sayyid Qutb and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although an argument can be 
made that Sayyid Qutb was already radicalized even before his arrests upon 
returning from the U.S., the torture during his prison time hardened his stance 
towards his fellow Muslims. Lawrence Wright writes that:  
Qutb had a high fever when he was arrested; nonetheless, the 
state-security officers handcuffed him and forced him to walk to 
prison. He fainted several times along the way. For hours he was 
held in a cell with vicious dogs, and then during long periods of 
interrogation, he was beaten.107  
Just like Sayyid Qutb, Ayman al-Zawahiri was also subjected to torture in 
the prison. “Because of his status, Zawahiri was subjected to frequent beatings 
and other ingenious and sadistic forms of punishment.”108 These traumatic 
events in his life, coupled with his religious and political leanings which had 
already matured, put him in the losses frame, and led him towards the path of 
violence. This also elevated his status and made him a leader who, with 
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complete disregard for his personal safety, would raise his voice for the 
oppressed people of his country.  
2. Personal Inadequacies 
Dissatisfaction with current circumstances may be the result of personal 
failures in an individual’s life. Instead of looking inward, some individuals may try 
to blame others for their inadequacies. In this regard, one of the Madrid train 
bombers, Serhane Fakhet, a Tunisian, was a perceived failure in his life, though 
his father and mother were both successful in their lives and respected figures in 
society. He was truly dubbed “the dreamer.”109 According to Scott Atran: 
… at first, he wanted to promote Muslim-European relations …, but 
the other Arab students weren’t all that interested. He tried setting 
up a radio station, which also fell through. Then he tried selling 
imported clothes from Tunisia, which didn’t work out. He tried 
importing candies, and that failed too.110 
These failures placed him in a losses frame, and the place where he ultimately 
found solace was religion, but from there he was driven towards violence to 
prove his worth in society.  
Similarly, the Times Square bomber, Faisal Shehzad, was an educated 
individual who once lost his job, had to abandon his home to the bank, and 
seemed estranged from his wife, before finding solace in a militant religious 
rebirth.111  Aum Shinrikyo’s leader, Shoko Asahara, was blind in one eye and had 
diminished vision in the other. He was sent to a boarding school for the blind; 
however, he soon developed influence over the blind students, and according to 
Alex Hudson, “exhibited a strong tendency to dominate people.”112 
Sayyid Qutb, one of the founders of modern day al-Qaeda, was a mid-
level government clerk in Egypt. Although he liked to be called a great writer and 
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a vehement opponent of King Farouk’s regime, “he had never gotten to the front 
rank of the contemporary Arab literary scene, a fact that galled him throughout 
his career.”113 Another example is Anders Breivik, who despite trying his hand at 
everything, failed to succeed in anything, and ultimately resorted to using 
violence in order for his ideas to be taken seriously.  
All the above examples support the idea that people with personal 
inadequacies may find themselves in a losses frame and thus be more inclined to 
the use of violence to prove their worth to the world in general and to their 
societies in particular. These inadequacies are sufficient cause for them to look 
for more non-traditional means to define themselves and achieve satisfaction for 
their inner self. This same dilemma can be found in a military commander who, 
unable to convince his subordinates through reasoning, may resort to the use of 
coercion, both physical and mental, to enforce his point of view.  
3. Personality 
Some individuals’ behavior towards the losses frame, and thus violence, is 
a result of their personality, be it introverted, extroverted, or violent. The 
underwear bomber, Umar Abdulmutallab, possessed an introverted personality. 
Despite being a gifted student from a well-off family, he felt lonely and out of 
place in a foreign school. According to Scott Atran, “On Facebook, he frequently 
mused about loneliness and love, his sexual frustrations, and his need to marry 
soon because ‘the hair of a woman can easily arouse a man.’”114  
In contrast, Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of LTTE (Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam), possessed a violent personality. Rex Hudson observes the 
following in a Library of Congress report: 
During his childhood … [he] spent his days killing birds and 
squirrels with a slingshot. An average student, he preferred 
historical novels on the glories of ancient Tamil conquerors to his 
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text books. As a youth, he became swept up in the growing 
militancy. … After dropping out of school at age 16, he began to 
associate with Tamil ‘activist gangs.’115   
Due to his personality, which was cocooned in mistrust, “he murdered many of 
his trusted commanders for suspected treason.”116 
Abu Nidal of The Abu Nidal Organization, leader of a splinter terrorist 
organization from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), has been 
termed an “introvert and stubborn,” by Alex Hudson.117  The high school 
reputation of Aum Shinrikyo’s Shoko Asahara as a  “violence prone, judo-
proficient con artist and avaricious bully had earned him the fear of his 
classmates, as well as $3000, by the time he graduated from high school in 
 975.”118 These two individuals so far apart geographically behaved in the same 
manner because of their personalities, be they introverted or violent.  
According to Wright, Sayyid Qutb, who remained single throughout his life, 
belonged to that category of persons who simply despise the opposite sex. 
According to the author, “sexuality threatened him, and he had withdrawn into a 
shell of disapproval, seeing sex as the main enemy of salvation.”119 During his 
stay in the U.S., Sayyid Qutb stayed mostly at home. As Qutb himself mentions, 
“Here in this strange place, this huge workshop they call ‘the new world,’ I feel as 
though my spirit, thoughts, and body live in loneliness.”120 Sayyid Qutb despised 
Western values and norms, the notion of freedom, especially for females, and the 
West’s materialistic culture. He thought of these collectively as immoral values 
and practices, which were trying to corrupt him as well as his country through 
foreign influence. While living in the U.S., Sayyid Qutb never criticized the 
materialistic ways which he so despised, probably due to his shy and introverted 
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personality. However, Wright speculates that “perhaps he kept the slights to 
himself until he could safely broadcast them at home.”121 
Regarding Ayman al-Zawahiri, Wright writes that he was fearless, self-
righteous, and had total conviction in his own beliefs which produced “head-
strong qualities that would invariably be associated with him in the future and that 
would propel him into conflict with nearly everyone.”122 After being rounded up for 
alleged charges of assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, once slapped by the Chief of Police, slapped him back. According to 
Wright, “until that moment, he [Ayman] had never … resorted to violence. 
Zawahiri immediately became known among the other prisoners as the man who 
struck back.”123 
Daniel McGowan, an ELF member, is described by his sister, as having 
an “Obsession with recycling.”124 Another member of ELF, Jake Ferguson was 
introverted and not fond of talking to people; however, he was a junkie and an 
outlaw as well, who has been termed “a pirate having a bad boy image, which he 
really was.”125 Both of these ELF members, though belonging to the two very 
opposite social poles, joined together for a cause dear to them.  
Due to his introverted nature, Timothy McVeigh developed a strange 
personality. According to Nathan Springer:  
He was scrawny, uncoordinated, and small for his size, which made 
him an easy mark. McVeigh dealt with the escalating problem in the 
only way he knew how, by secluding himself from others. [He] 
became more of a loner, where he would escape into a world of 
fantasy and make believe. Like heroes from his comic books, he 
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would create scenarios of revenge to atone for past moments of 
weakness and to defeat his enemies.126  
According to his BBC News profile, “McVeigh embarked on a flirtation with the 
militia movement, which believes that ordinary Americans are under imminent 
threat of attack from nuclear war, Communists or central government. He began 
to stockpile food, water and guns, and in 1988 he and a friend bought ten acres 
of woodland where they practiced shooting and planned to build a bunker.”127  
Another case is that of Hakimullah Mehsud of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP), who according to the BBC News crew:  
Has a wild streak which borders on the reckless. When they met in 
2007, he took the BBC crew for a drive, handling the vehicle like a 
man possessed, manoeuvring [sic] around razor sharp bends at 
barely possible speeds. He finished the demonstration by braking 
inches short of a several hundred-foot drop. While the BBC crew 
sat in stunned silence, he just laughed chillingly and stuck the car in 
reverse to smoothly continue the journey.128  
4. Idealism 
The urge to do everything in the best possible and just way may move an 
individual towards idealism. Mosab writes, “I was scared, but I also felt a bit 
important, as though I was becoming dangerous to Israel.”129 Mustafa Duyar, a 
DHKP/C terrorist, recalls a magazine article in which “they were talking about a 
free and just world without any abuse. A world that nobody is subjected to 
injustice and everyone is equal. I said to myself that this is the world worth 
fighting for, and I was ready to pay any price for that.”130 
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Bassam Abu Sharif remembers his dialogue with his father, who tried to 
stop him from joining the armed Palestinian struggle.  He writes:  
Though I could see his point of view, deep down inside I knew: a 
human being whose people have no future is himself without value 
unless he fights for what is right. … I did not want to be an eternal 
foreigner, a displaced person, a landless, homeless, stateless, 
shamed, despised Palestinian refugee. A Ph.D. What is that, I 
asked my father, when we have no country?131  
On further insistence by his father, Abu Sharif replies, “I would rather be in prison 
in my own country than be a free man in exile. I would rather be dead.”132 
In a letter to his mother, Renato Curcio, a Red Army Brigades terrorist, 
explains why he chose the path of violence and cannot leave it. He writes, “My 
enemies are the enemies of humanity and of intelligence, those who have built 
and build their accursed fortunes on the material and intellectual misery of the 
people. Theirs is the hand that has banged shut the door of my cell.”133 Sayyid 
Qutb, due to his religious inclination, was an idealist, and materialism was an 
anathema to him. He says, “The fact remained that materialism was the real 
American god. The soul has no value to Americans.”134  
Daniel Mc owan’s sister highlights his idealism by recalling that “he had 
different ways of doing things … never used a machine which might hurt the 
environment.”135 McGowan himself says, “I couldn’t believe that people accepted 
what was going on. Why are we being so gentle in our activism, when they are 
butchering the forests? What years of letter writing and picketing had never been 
able to do, a single arson had accomplished.”136 
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5. Plight of Others 
Abu Sharif of the PLO mentions the conditions of other Palestinians in a 
refugee camp in Jordan as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, “Suweileh camp 
was misery piled on catastrophe: a few tents pitched crazily in the deserts, 
abandoned possessions scattered across the sand, thousands and thousands of 
people, no food, very little water, no facilities, nothing … this was the nation of 
Palestine.”137 He further writes about a young girl, who came up to him and said: 
Do you want to sleep with me? She asked. Give me five dinars … I 
sat down heavily on the hot sand. So Palestinian girls had to 
prostitute themselves now, did they? It had come to that. They had 
to sell themselves, dishonor themselves just to survive?  Anger 
took hold of me as I stared out across the desert. … I understood 
now what I had to do. There was no going back. My own fight 
began here, now. … I would regain our country, or die for it.138  
Similarly, the love of the near and dear ones can also motivate people to 
adopt risky behavior, though it may not be the plight of others, but to seek a 
better future for family and friends. An Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade member, Nabeel 
Masood, who exploded himself in March 2004 near an Israeli port of Ashdod, is a 
case in point. According to his father, he sacrificed his life out of his love of 
others. His father explains, “My son didn’t die just for the sake of a cause; he 
died also for his cousins and friends. He died for the people he loved.”139  
Osama Bin Laden’s mother remembers how after his religious and political 
awakening, he “sometimes would sit in front of the television and weep over the 
news from Palestine. … He was more concerned, sad, and frustrated about the 
situation in Palestine in particular, and the Arab and Muslim world in general.”140 
The same was the case with the activists and sympathizers of ELF, who became 
radicalized during a demonstration in Eugene, Oregon, where the brutal use of 
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force by law enforcement agencies against the peaceful activists protesting the 
cutting of trees in the downtown traumatized them and ultimately moved them to 
violence.141 It was both the plight of others in the shape of people, as well as 
plight of the planet itself in the shape of cutting of trees or killing of fish in the 
oceans that radicalized the members of the ELF.  
Similarly concerned for the plight of others, Timothy McVeigh, “was 
distressed by the 1992 catastrophe at Ruby Ridge - a siege and shootout where 
federal officials shot and killed the wife of survivalist Randy Weaver and their 14-
year-old son. But it was the storming of the Branch Davidian compound at Waco 
the following year that provoked him into acting on his frustrations.”142 McVeigh 
traveled to Waco to see the effects of the actions by law enforcement agencies 
and was traumatized by the evident use of aggressive force. In the letter entitled 
"Why I bombed the Murray building," McVeigh explains that he lost patience after 
waiting for the government to apologize for Waco. "I reached the decision to go 
on the offensive—to put a check on government abuse of power, where others 
had failed in stopping the federal juggernaut running amok.”143  
B. ENVIRONMENT 
1. Geography 
Both a geographical location and the external physical environment may 
affect an individual’s perception of himself or herself, as well as the perception of 
others. If an individual is living in an area filled with conflict, or one with no 
economic or educational opportunities, or one filled with injustices and inequality, 
these features, alone or combined, may be enough to put him in the losses 
frame. According to Mosab Hassan Yousef, “three-quarters of a million 
Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes in the territories that 
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became the State of Israel,”144 and they had to live in the refugee camps.  As a 
result of living in the difficult environment of these camps, “most of the impatient 
young Hamas activists were from the Refugee camps.”145 Similarly, Ed Husain’s 
high school environment in Britain was nothing close to normal. He writes about 
burning down a classroom in the school: “All the boys knew who had burnt [ it ] 
… but no one dared to speak. The local youth gangs in Stepney would ‘knife 
us’… A tabloid newspaper … dubbed Stepney Green the ‘worst school in Britain.’ 
Teachers were embarrassed to say they worked there.”146 
Two arch-rivals in the Palestine-Israel conflict, who ultimately became 
friends, Abu Sharif and Uzi Mahnaimi, exemplify this dilemma. Regarding their 
joint memoirs, Peter David says, “Men do not make history on a clean slate. They 
are all in some way the prisoners of the circumstances they inherit from their 
fathers and grandfathers.”147 After U.S. President Truman endorsed the transfer 
of a hundred thousand Jewish refugees into Palestine, Sayyid Qutb wrote, “I hate 
those Westerners and despise them.”148 
Geography in this context also includes the social environment prevalent 
in a particular area. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan 
are a case in point, where the old legal system has given rise to desperation on 
the part of youngsters, who do not find a hopeful way for their future. According 
to Naveed Shinwari:  
Local administration in each agency [in FATA] is managed by a 
Political Agent (PA), who is a federal civil servant; … The Political 
Agents perform several functions at the same time – they act as an 
executive, judge and revenue collector. In facilitating their role they 
are assisted by the former-colonial Malik system (a local leader 
appointed by the government to represent their community). As 
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Maliks are appointed by the PA their independence and loyalty can 
be questionable: with some acting in accordance with the wishes of 
the PA rather than the interests of the people they are supposed to 
be representing. Generally, the local people feel that they have 
been marginalized and inequitably treated.149 
Also, the lack of mainstream educational institutions compels the local people to 
look towards the only available alternative: the Madrassah. However, if the 
madrassah is teaching true Islamic ideology which is non-violent, its students 
may not be able to find jobs other than as mosque clerics, and if the madrassah 
is teaching violence, its students are already destined to be the fuel of global 
extremist violence.  
According to BBC News, “Hakimullah Mehsud's only schooling was at a 
small village madrassah (religious school  in Hangu district,”150 and even that he 
did not complete. This also highlights the environment within these madrassahs, 
which typically is filled with violence perpetrated by violent clerics against young 
children, and this environment then leads the youngsters to despise their 
religious education. However, the introduction of physical violence at such a 
young age in such madrassahs already puts individuals in the losses frame and 
leads them to adopt risky behavior.   
2. Immigrant’s Dilemma 
Ed Husain writes, “ rowing up in Britain in the  980s was not easy. … We 
grew up oblivious of the fact that large numbers of us were somehow different – 
we were ‘Asians.’”151 Although he mentions that his teachers were not biased 
towards people with different ethnicities, British society as a whole was full of 
hostility towards non-white people. He writes also about the religious teachings in 
his home, which were, “rooted not in Britain but in the eastern Muslim tradition of 
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seeking guidance and religious advice from an elderly sage.”152 Subjected to this 
external aggression and the paradoxical situation of prioritizing between his 
internal and external environment, Ed Husain was placed in a losses frame right 
from his childhood. 
Abu Sharif explains the dilemma he faced from forced displacement. He 
writes:  
Our family had been driven from their lands, their homes, by force. 
Injustice had been piled upon violent theft. How could we 
Palestinian have allowed it to happen? There was now a 
Palestinian Diaspora, just like the Jewish one before it. Our people 
were scattered to the four winds.”153 
The Muslim immigrant communities in Europe are also a flash point and 
have already become a nuisance for law enforcement agencies, and the trend is 
likely to continue into the foreseeable future. Political authorities, by banning 
traditional attire of the Muslims such as the scarf, are alienating immigrant 
Muslims from mainstream society and forcing them to fall back to the islands of 
their respective communities, which in the end will further isolate them. The most 
prudent option would have been to regard the scarves or other clothing issues as 
dress items, rather than focusing on them as religious identity outfits.  
3. Cultural Norms and Values 
Ed Husain’s parents chose to send him to a boy’s only school. This was 
mostly to keep him from distractions. His parents thought a single sex institution 
would provide a more favorable environment for education.154  He writes, “I think 
my parents eventually realized that choosing Stepney Green had been a 
mistake. And they were keen to compensate.”155 But the compensation was not 
in the shape of changing Ed Husain’s environment; instead they tried to 
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compensate in a manner in line with their cultural and traditional norms. Rather 
than removing problem A, they tried to incentivize him with benefit B, which had 
nothing to do with the original problem. They were trying to cure the wound with a 
medicine, albeit a wrong one. Instead of lavishing non-related benefits, like taking 
him on trips to London, Manchester or Birmingham, it likely would have been 
more appropriate to change his school, thereby removing him from the 
environment which ultimately put him in a losses frame.156 
Correspondingly, Sayyid Qutb and his companion were not admitted into a 
theater in the U.S. once because they were dark colored. Later, upon realizing 
that they were not black but Egyptians, the theater owner apologized, but Sayyid 
Qutb at that point refused to enter. He was “galled by the fact that black 
Egyptians could be admitted but black Americans could not.”157 This refusal was 
indicative of both Eastern and religious values inculcated in Sayyid Qutb, which 
led him to adopt such a behavior.  Despite being apologized to by the theater 
owner, he aligned himself with the downtrodden strata of the society.  
4. Prevalent Trends 
Before the start of the first Intifada, the prevalent mood inside the 
Palestinian territories was one of despair, and the only outlet seemed to be to 
resist the Israelis through all possible means. Mosab describes this despair, 
“They were not terrorists by nature. They were just people who had run out of 
hope and options. Their backs were to the wall. They had nothing left and 
nothing to lose. They cared nothing for the world’s opinion or even their own 
lives.”158 Along similar lines, Ed Husain explains the trends prevalent in Britain for 
the Muslim community. He writes, “I had tried to be Muslim and felt as though I 
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had failed. At that time, being a young Muslim could only mean being an Islamist. 
…  randpa’s Islam was for elderly people.”159 
According to Scot Atran, people behind most of the terrorist attacks in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were “Afghan Alumni,”160 which clearly 
reflects a prevailing trend in the aftermath of the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s. 
These alumni of mythical fighters who had defeated one of the world’s 
superpowers created a trend for the use of violence to achieve political 
objectives, and the same trend is being followed now by those adopting the way 
of Jihad. In their eyes even the world’s superpower, the U.S., can be coerced.  
Leila Khaled of the PFLP was a victim of her environment, as well as the 
prevalent trend in the American University of Beirut, where the Arab Cultural 
Club, Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and the General Union of Palestinian 
Students were very active on campus. In  963, she was admitted into the “ANM’s 
first paramilitary contingent of university students and was active in ANM 
underground activities.”161 The same trend can be observed in universities the 
world over in the 1960s, when the only chic thing was to align oneself with 
socialist movement and, thus, oppose the sitting governments.    
In Egypt, due to Sadat’s acquiescent government, the general trend in the 
universities became more radicalized. “Young Islamic activists were appearing 
on campuses.”162 They were provided with arms by Sadat’s government in order 
to defend themselves against the Marxists and Nasserites, which ultimately 
resulted in the radicalization of most of Egypt’s universities.163 However, in the 
end, these same weapons were used against the very government that had 
provided them.  
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During the times when ELF was agitating to save the earth, the trend of 
displaying the placards to protest had been very common; however, since the 
members were unable to influence the authorities through that trend, they 
resorted to violence. Tim Lewis says, “Since the hippy-like trend of holding 
placards and posters was not working, thus people turned to more aggressive 
protests. People called it sabotage and monkey wrenching, they would glue 
locks, put sugar in gas tanks of bulldozers. Dug trenches to stop movement of 
machinery.”164 
5. Saturation of Information 
Daniel McGowan of ELF says that after his first encounter with 
environmental activists in a conference where people were shown a movie about 
destruction of both the earth and ocean life by corporate entities, his reaction 
was, “What the hell are we doing? I got pretty much involved instantly. I protested 
constantly.”165 However, he truly became radicalized after watching the Eugene, 
Oregon incident in which brutal methods were used by police against the 
unarmed protestors, and he realized that simple protests were not going to work. 
Though this reaction may also fit under the category of plight of others, in the 
case of McGowan, the availability of information on the Internet and television 
made him aware of such happenings in a faraway place like Eugene.  
Ed Husain writes about the accessibility of videos depicting the brutalities 
perpetrated against Muslims in Bosnia: “In early  993, a thirty-minute video was 
handed to me about the war in Bosnia, the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the 
Balkans. I watched it in horror and then decided that it must be shown to our 
students to raise money for Bosnian Muslims.”166 The burning of the U.S. 
embassy in Benghazi can also be correlated to the accessibility of information by 
the masses, which resulted in mass protests, and the issue of a blasphemous 
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movie about Prophet Muhammad was utilized by the terrorists to further their 
own aims. 
6. Economic Deprivation 
With regard to economic conditions as enablers for the losses frame, the 
9/   Commission Report mentions, “When people lose hope, when societies 
breakdown … the breeding grounds for terrorism are created. Backward 
economic policies and repressive political regimes slip hopelessness into the 
societies, where ambitions and passions have no constructive outlet.”167 Mosab 
writes about his family’s economic difficulties where nobody was ready to help 
him. He writes, “Apart from trying to keep me in line, no one helped our family 
while my father was in prison.”168 A DHKP/C terrorist mentions that the terrorists 
found my economic weakness and offered me warm friendships, free education, 
equality, and a way to find justice, and by exploiting these, made me part of their 
organization.”169 
With regard to LTTE terrorists, Hudson writes, “The majority of the rank-
and-file membership belongs to the lower middle class. Almost all LTTE cadres 
have been recruited from the lower-caste strata of Jaffna society.”170  According 
to a Library of Congress report, “The [Irish] terrorist is invariably from a working 
class background, not because of some Marxist doctrine but because the loyalist 
and republican areas of Northern Ireland are primarily working class. Quite likely, 
he is unemployed. … His education is probably limited, because he probably left 
school at age  5 or  6 without formal qualifications.”171 
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C. IDEOLOGY 
You have your ideology and I have mine. 
 –Khalil Gibran 
1. Loss of Identity 
A loss of identity does not relate to the physical loss of a material item, but 
to a perception of the loss of specific values, norms related to religious, political, 
social and cultural spheres, any one of which may put people into a losses frame. 
Besides the perceived loss of intangible values, the importance of identity also 
correlates to a physical identity, especially to one different from the mainstream 
or prevalent societal identity. The dilemma of losing one’s identity can also be 
described as living in two worlds at the same time, especially when they are far 
apart individually and collectively.  
Ed Husain writes, “Cut off from Britain, isolated from the Eastern culture of 
our parents, Islamism provided us with a purpose and place in life. More 
importantly, we felt as though we were the pioneers, at the cutting edge of this 
new global development of confronting the West in its own backyard.” He further 
explains his dilemma of studying at an all-boys school by recalling a classmate 
who was a loner like him:  
Like me, he prayed regularly. Like me, he was a misfit at school. 
Together, we started to assert a new identity: we were young, 
Muslim, studious, and London born. We were not immigrants and 
neither understood the mentality of peers who reminisced about 
their villages in Bangladesh.172  
In the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the humiliating defeat of the 
Arab armies not only affected the Arab identity, but also gave rise to Islamic 
fundamentalism. As Wright observes, “The profound appeal of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Egypt and elsewhere was born in this shocking debacle. A 
newly strident voice was heard in the mosques; the voice said that they had been 
defeated by a force far larger than the tiny country of Israel. God had turned 
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against the Muslims. The only way back to Him was to return to pure religion. 
The voice answered despair with a simple formulation: Islam is the solution.”173 
One of the consequences of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict probably was 
the weakening of Arab nationalism, which gave rise to militant organization. Abu 
Sharif writes, “In Arabic, the humiliation of  967 is called al-Nakbah: ‘the 
catastrophe’ … However small they were to begin with, groups like the PFLP 
found in this catastrophe an opportunity. They rushed headlong into the vacuum. 
The people, who had lost faith completely in Arab nationalism, turned to these 
groups in huge numbers.”174 Mosab writes, “Palestinians were imprisoning other 
Palestinians. … Now my hatred had multiple focal points. I hated the Palestinian 
Authority and Yasser Arafat, I hated Israel, and I hated secular Palestinians.”175 
This dilemma highlights a lack of an identity with which Mosab could align 
himself.  
In 1974, Abdullah Ocalan, leader of PKK, formed the “university 
association whose initial focus was on gaining official recognition for Kurdish 
language and cultural rights.”176 Similarly, A 30-year terrorist member of the 
DHKP/C mentions his dilemma of choosing between right and wrong, “In those 
times, we were facing the difficulty of finding our own identity in an environment 
filled with rightists and leftists conflicts.”177  
For members of Aum Shinrikyo, “The first young Japanese to be free of 
financial pressures, the Aum Shinrikyo recruits were wondering if there was more 
to life than job security and social conformity.”178 This wondering probably rests 
in the concept of Occidentalism, which though dissipated in the post-World War II 
period, once the Japanese adopted the Western values of modernization and 
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enlightenment, was accomplished by crushing the indigenous traditions and old 
Japanese values. Once a society accepts outside influence, it likely loses its own 
identity in the process, and afterwards, its people start to question who they 
really are. For some the answer to this question lies in movements like Aum 
Shinrikyo, which provide an ideal platform for taking people back towards their 
roots.  
2. Orientalism 
Abu Sharif of the PLO mentions the environment that motivated him 
towards the violent path he adopted, but ultimately left. He writes, “To most Arab 
youths growing up in the 1950s, Nasser represented a dream and a symbol: a 
symbol of Arab nationalism, a dream of Arab unity, of Arab liberation, and of Arab 
progress. … I was seventeen, and spoiling for a fight. I had no need to rebel – I 
had cause. Nasser-led Arab nationalism was going to save my people: and I was 
going to be in there at the kill.”179 This rise of Arab nationalism possibly stemmed 
from a sense of being at the mercy of the West which, through the prism of 
Orientalism, possessed a biased view of the Arabs and other Eastern societies.  
Concerning the danger that the Muslim Brotherhood posed to 
modernization, British Orientalist, James Heyworth-Dunne once wrote, “If the 
Brothers succeed in coming to power, Egypt will never progress and will stand as 
an obstacle to civilization.”180 Yet after being personally confronted by Heyworth-
Dunne, Sayyid Qutb writes, “I decided to enter the Brotherhood even before I left 
the [Heyworth-Dunne’s] house.”181 This suggests that despite a change of 
religion, an orientalist mentality—which still thought that a religious organization a 
misfit to run the affairs of a country—could not be changed. After Sayyid Qutb’s 
experiences in America, Wright notes: 
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instead of being liberalized …, he returned even more radicalized 
… The white man in Europe or America is our number one enemy. 
The white man crushes us underfoot while we teach our children 
about his civilization, his universal principles and noble objectives. 
… We are endowing our children with amazement and respect for 
the master who tramples our honor and enslaves us.182 
3. Narratives and Historical Context 
My words will be stronger if they kill me. 
 –Sayyid Qutb 
Mosab Hassan Yousef writes, “Many people in the West who stereotype 
all Muslims as terrorists don’t know about the side of Islam that reflects love and 
mercy. … It facilitates education and welfare. It unites and strengthens.”183 
Mosab writes about Hamas that it was an idea revolving around a narrative 
which, according to him, suggested that “[Hamas] was a ghost. An idea. You 
can’t destroy an idea; you can only stimulate it.”184  
At the start of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Abu Sharif showed his 
jubilation. He writes, “When I heard the news that the war had started, a 
thousand birds started singing in my heart. Nasser had acted! At last the Israelis 
would learn about Arab strength. We would avenge the humiliations of 1948; we 
would regain the lands, property and freedom that were rightfully ours. We would 
have justice.”185 
Ed Husain became estranged from his parents due to the effects of the 
narrative which said his parents were not good Muslims. As a result of this, he 
started drifting away from them. He writes, “As time passed, my parents and I 
were hardly on speaking terms.”186 Remembering a discussion with his friend 
about the democratic system, Ed Husain writes, “Democracy is haram! Forbidden 
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in Islam. Don’t you know that? Democracy is a  reek concept, rooted in demos 
and kratos – people’s rule. In Islam, we don’t rule; Allah rules.”187 
According to Sayyid Qutb, “Islam … is a complete system with laws, social 
codes, economic rules, and its own method of government. Only Islam offered 
the formula for creating a just and godly society. … It was not a battle between 
capitalism and communism; it was between Islam and materialism.”188 After 
talking to the detainees in a prison in Saudi Arabia who had volunteered for Iraq, 
Scot Atran says that the reason people volunteered lay in the narrative or context 
of “stories of women raped, the killing of innocents, and desecration of the Koran; 
all mentioned Abu  hraib.”189 
In contrast, Wright attributes the radicalization of prisoners inside Cairo 
who were tortured and suffered humiliation at the hands of fellow Muslims. 
However, according to Wright, the blame is not laid on the Egyptian government 
alone, but also on the West, which was responsible for enabling the repressive 
regimes. He writes, “They held the West responsible for corrupting and 
humiliating Islamic society. Indeed, the theme of humiliation, which is the 
essence of torture, is important to understanding the radical Islamists’ rage. 
Egypt’s prisons became a factory for producing militants whose need for 
retribution—they called it justice—was all consuming.”190 
Daniel McGowan, in an interview, states that ELF’s tactics of using of 
arson should not be taken as an outburst of young crazy individuals. He defends 
his actions by saying that such tactics is not simple, and it is hideous to label 
them as terrorist activities, since no one was injured in any of their arsons. This 
narrative, which clearly aims at avoiding collateral damage, especially against 
human beings, is possibly what convinced many others to join the movement.  
                                            
187 Husain, The Islamist, 78.  
188 Wright, The Looming Tower, 17.  
189 Atran, Talking to the Enemy, 115.  
190 Wright, The Looming Tower, 61,  
 66 
4. Analogies 
Historical comparisons with today’s circumstances may lead people to 
incorrect evaluations and ultimately wrong conclusions. In support of the ideology 
of Hizb-Ut-Tahrir, Ed Husain quotes one of its founders, Omar Bakri, in response 
to the need for jihad to support the Bosnian Muslims, “Where others cited UN 
resolutions, Omar Bakri cited history. He spoke about the power of the Abbasid 
and Ottoman caliphs to protect Muslims against non-Muslim aggression.”191  
At some point an external threat or invader, like the British forces in 
Afghanistan in the 19th century, served only to unite the most polarized and 
fractured tribes. They not only became united in face of a common enemy, but 
also defeated it, or to put it simply, created an environment in which that enemy 
could not win. The same analogy is used by the Afghans for the current U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan, which receives further credence from the defeat of one 
of the world’s superpowers, the USSR, and has provided the Afghans with a 
sense of moral invincibility and resilience.  
Environmental activists typically draw an analogy between the workings of 
nature and those of human actions, between the cutting of trees or catching of 
fish from the ocean and the killing of innocent living beings. This analogy places 
the activists in a camp which basically cares for the interests of the less 
fortunate, who cannot fight their own case, and ultimately puts them in a losses 
frame.  
5. Elite’s Interests 
As discussed in Chapter III, there are two kinds of elites who may 
influence an individual: the culturally embedded elites like parents, teachers, or 
other elderly figures in the family; and the political or politically motivated 
religious elites. These elites, though acting differently—in the name of tradition, 
customs or culture, or for their personal power or glory—provide enough reasons 
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to place an individual in the losses frame. Ed Husain fits in the first category, 
since he was influenced by his parents, elders, and others, whereas Mosab fits 
into the second category, having been influenced by Palestinian leaders 
championing the cause of an independent Palestinian state.  
Mosab realized that the Palestinian struggle was accomplishing nothing 
but serving the elite’s interests. He writes, “From Yasser Arafat’s perspective, the 
uprising seemed to be all about politics, money, and holding onto the power. He 
was a grand manipulator, the Palestinian master. On camera, he condemned 
Hamas for its attacks against civilians inside Israel. … But he did little to interfere, 
content to let Hamas do his dirty work and take the heat from the international 
community.”192  
A leading DHKP/C terrorist who served more than 30 years in the 
organization writes, “The leaders of the terror organizations were separated from 
the society, and they were exploiting the others in order to maintain a luxurious 
life in foreign countries. At one time, once I refused to go back to Turkey because 
of my persecution, they prisoned me in a home for one month, where I waited for 
my death.”193 
Wright mentions the role of a Syrian gym teacher, who was a member of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, in the religious and political awakening of Osama Bin 
Laden. When he was 14 years old, “Osama stopped watching cowboy shows … 
he refused to wear Western dress.”194 Ayman al-Zawahiri was also influenced by 
his uncle Mahfouz Azzam, a disciple of Sayyid Qutb, and the uncle instilled in 
young Zawahiri the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, which ultimately put him in the 
losses frame. Like Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden was influenced by the 
writings of Sayyid Qutb. Bin Laden’s friend mentions that “We were trying to 
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understand what Islam has to say about how we eat, who we marry, how we talk. 
We read Sayyid Qutb. He was the one who most affected our generation.”195 
D. BIOLOGY 
For young men, mortal combat in a great cause provides the 
ultimate adventure and glory to gain maximum esteem in the eyes 
of many and, most dearly, in the hearts of their peers. 
 –Scott Atran 
1. Manhood through Violence 
In keeping with globalization, youngsters generally are becoming more 
independent and want to be left alone in the name of freedom. However, they are 
only interested in freedom of choice without the burden of sharing the 
responsibility. A search for respect and a meaning in life may end up placing 
such individuals in a losses frame, if their dreams remain unfulfilled. Two such 
examples are Anders Behring Breivik and Shoko Asahara, both of whom turned 
to violence due to their inability to find a respectable place in their respective 
societies. Breivik and Asahara are both members of civilized societies; however, 
in order to prove their worth, both resorted to the use of violence. Asahara’s 
visual disability and his desire for respect and acceptance in society pushed him 
towards a more effective and noticeable method in the shape of violence.  
Serdar Bayraktutan identifies two certain contradictions of the individuals 
who are under police custody for terrorism-related crimes: first, a lack of 
communication with their families and the absence of love, and second, mutinous 
and reactive behaviors associated with their tender ages.196 Individuals learn and 
form their basic character, including an understanding of love, respect and trust, 
through their life experiences in the family. Devoid of the relations with their 
parents, some individuals look for other means to satisfy their need for love and 
respect. 
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In this regard, Timothy McVeigh is a case in point, reflecting the dilemma 
previously explained. After McVeigh’s parents went their separate ways, the most 
influential person in his life quickly became his grandfather who introduced him to 
what would become the greatest passion of his life: guns. At the age of 13, 
McVeigh received his first gun from his grandfather. According to the Nathan 
Springer, “Under Edward’s [grandfather] watchful eye, McVeigh seemed to bloom 
with the gun, an excitement unmatched in other activities he attempted.”197 This 
turns out to be Timothy’s hobby and passion.  Springer further writes that “For 
McVeigh, the gun was nourishment for his self-esteem. Guns seemed to be the 
great equalizer in his life, the more proficient he made himself with guns, the 
more confident he felt.”198  
Ayman al-Zawahiri is another individual who, due to the influence of his 
uncle Mahfouz Azzam early in life, developed both a religious and political 
awakening. The same can be discerned from his behavior at the age of fifteen, 
when he “helped to form an underground cell devoted to overthrow the 
government and establish an Islamist state.”199 Though this aspect of Zawahiri’s 
life does not explicitly contain the element of violence, the idea of forming an 
underground cell at such a tender age clearly reflects his leanings towards the 
same direction.  
2. Mental Vulnerability of the Young 
As youngsters, individuals are more susceptible to the influences of violent 
terrorist activities because they generally do not make decisions by fully 
analyzing the ramifications of their actions. Mosab explains his dilemma by 
writing that “at fifteen years of age, I saw everything in stark black and white. 
There were good guys and bad guys. And the bad guys deserved everything 
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they got.”200 In his perception the Palestinians were good, and the Israelis were 
bad. In the summer of 1996, while in prison, he says that, “Though I was only 
eighteen, I felt as if I had lived several lifetimes in just a few months.”201  
Ed Husain also was exploited due to his youth; he mentions a moment 
with a friend who declared, “You must choose between family and  od’s work. 
The Islamic movement is more important to us than our families.”202 At such a 
young age, he could not think of balancing between the two authorities in his life: 
his parents and his religion. However, he made his decision and “one night late in 
the summer … left home for the Islamic movement without a penny in my pocket 
and with only the clothes I was wearing.”203 He further writes, “The Hizb’s mental 
barriers were not easily broken down, and only slowly did I become conscious of 
how deeply the Hizb had penetrated both my life and teenage mind.”204 His 
young age and inexperience drove him to the ranks of an extremist organization 
where he thought he would find the answers to the pursuit of his life. 
Farhin, a Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist from Indonesia, highlights the 
importance of being part of a group of youngsters. He writes, “We played soccer 
and remained brothers—in Malaysia, when I worked on the chicken farm … then 
back in Java.”205 Besides actual kinship, Atran mentions, “Imagined kinship—the 
rhetoric and ritual of brotherhood, motherland, family, or friends, and the like—is 
also a critical ingredient of nearly all religious and political success, and another 
example of trick and tweak.”206 
Abu Sharif also mentions his thoughts at a very young age, which 
reflected his bent towards obtaining justice at any cost. He writes:  
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The older I grew, the more I talked with members of my family, the 
more I read, the more I understood the word injustice. We must 
have justice, I thought; only justice. But how we were going to get 
this justice? That is a question to vex the thoughts of a sixteen year 
old boy.207 
3. Adolescence 
Adolescence is a time when youngsters look for ways, both positive and 
negative, to assert themselves. The internal struggle personifies the 
psychological need to satisfy one’s inner self; whereas, the external outburst 
exemplifies the need to prove one’s worth in society. This period also highlights 
the importance of doing something just to counter boredom. Mosab explains his 
personal dilemma of living in a volatile environment, but becoming bored even in 
the absence of violence. He writes, “There was so much violence that I actually 
became bored during those rare seasons when things were quiet. My friends and 
I started throwing stones too—to stir things up and to be respected as fighters in 
the resistance.”208  
This same point has been rightly captured by journalist Abul Taher, who 
observes that the “mean age at which a Muslim is radicalized is 2 .6 years.”209 
This age-related dilemma has been raised again by a Turkish left wing terrorist 
from DEV-SOL, who writes:  
[Eighteen] years old is the time period which is most dynamic 
emotionally, relations with the environment is [sic] always conflicted 
with ups and downs, and it’s the time full of both satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction without reasoning. With those conditions, I was kind 
of in a search, I was not pleased with the environment that I lived 
in, but I was not sure why?210  
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And this age-related violent behavior is not restricted to the Muslims, as Rona M. 
Fields noted in 1976 about the terrorists in the Anglo-Irish struggle, “Terrorists 
are most often adolescent youths from working class families.”211 
One of the friends of Osama bin Laden comments on bin Laden’s risky 
and reckless behavior; “We were riding horses in the desert, and we were really 
going very fast. I saw fine sand in front of us, and I told Osama this is dangerous, 
better stay away. He said no, and he continued. His horse turned over and he fell 
down. He got up laughing. Another time, we were riding in a jeep. Whenever he 
saw a hill, he would drive very fast and go over it, even though we didn’t know 
what was on the other side.”212 Although such trends could be categorized as the 
urges of the young, if left unchecked, the same trend may shape an individual’s 
behavior towards violence in the future.  
In a Library of Congress report, Hudson writes, “By  980 a majority of 
LTTE combatants were reportedly between  8 and 25 years of age. … In 1990 
approximately 75 percent of second-generation LTTE membership was below 30 
years of age, with about 50 percent between the ages of 15 and 21 and about 25 
percent between the ages of 25 and 29. Highly motivated and disciplined, most 
LTTE fighters are subteenagers [sic], according to an Indian authority.”213  
4. Criminality 
Although it is difficult to establish a direct correlation between criminality 
and terrorism, it has been observed that criminals inside the prisons have been 
exploited for new recruitment by the terrorist organizations. Mosab describes the 
environment inside the prison, “At Megiddo, Hamas was in total control inside the 
prison. Hamas was the largest and strongest organization there. Hamas made 
the rules, and everybody else played their game.”214 Therefore, if petty criminals 
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are left at the mercy of the terrorist organizations, controlling the prisons, such 
individuals, already in a losses frame due to their criminal behavior and the 
consequent general shunning from society, may become ideal recruits for 
terrorist activities.   
In  982 Shoko Asahara, “was arrested and convicted for peddling fake 
Chinese cures and his business collapsed as a result. Bankrupted, Asahara 
reportedly earned nearly $200,000 from a hotel scam that year.”215 This behavior 
could be the result of not performing well through established norms of Japanese 
society, but this trend led him towards the use of violence in asserting his 
authority.   
The fact that from an early age Jake Ferguson of ELF was a criminal may 
be attributed to his father already being in jail during those years. Jake was a 
junkie, always in conflict with law enforcement agencies. This trend led him to 
use violence in furthering the campaign of the ELF, which until that time had 
been mostly restricted to the use of peaceful means.216  
5. Imitating Elders 
The phenomenon of imitating elders is more pronounced in Eastern 
cultures, but the West is not immune to this trend. Irrespective of the part of the 
world, a youngster always looks towards his elders—parents, teachers, authority 
figures, etc.—to imitate successful people. However, these successful people 
may only be successful in the eyes of the youngsters, because success may be 
defined through the prism of the environment in which they are interacting.  Also, 
this imitation typically occurs without any cost and benefit analysis, because in 
the eyes of many youngsters, their elders are always right. However, this does 
not mean that anyone who imitates his elder will always be in the losses frame; 
rather, it may apply only to those who imitate their elders in the negative domain 
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exclusively. For example, after the arrest of his father, Mosab admired his father 
for his courage and steadfastness. He writes:  
He was handcuffed and hung from the ceiling. They used electric 
shocks on him until he passed out. When that failed, they beat him 
some more. But my father was strong. He remained silent, never 
giving the Israelis any information that could hurt Hamas or his 
Palestinian brothers.”217 
For Mosab, his role model was his father, who challenged the might of the 
Israelis, but did not budge, and by following in the footsteps of his father, he 
positioned himself in the losses frame at a young age.  
Leila Khaled of the PFLP was inspired by a Palestinian revolutionary of 
the 1930s, Izz Edeen Kassam, and in her words, she decided to become a 
revolutionary in order to liberate her people and herself.218 Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
current al-Qaeda leader grew up under the influence of his uncle Mahfouz 
Azzam, who was a true disciple of Sayyid Qutb. This indirect linkage between 
Ayman al-Zawahiri and Sayyid Qutb paved the way for Ayman’s radicalization at 
an early age, since he heard again and again from his uncle “about the purity of 
Qutb’s character and the torment he had endured in prison.”219 The effects of this 
indoctrination can be observed from an incident when Ayman refused a car ride, 
an exciting proposition at that time to a young person, since the car belonged to 
the judge who had “participated in the courts that killed Muslims.”220 
Given the empirics, it is possible to observe the most repeated trends in 
each category of placement in the losses frame. With this information we can 
prioritize the importance of certain reasons over others. To arrive at this 
conclusion, each category will be presented separately in graphic form; however, 
the complete data set showing all the categories together is also included as an 
appendix for reference. Besides including the individual terrorists, certain general 
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trends in prominent terrorist organizations have also been mentioned in the chart, 
and accordingly accounted for in each graph.  
From figures 4, 5, 6 and 7, it can be observed that there is an equal 
distribution in three categories, while psychology seems to be the most important 
element with a total of 50 counts, which is understandable because the 
psychological element impacts equally across borders, cultures and religions. 
Also with a total count of 24, the environment seems to be the least potent cause 
for being in a losses frame; however, all the other three categories are 
intertwined with the environment and may not be sufficient without it.  
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Figure 5.  Comparison of Subcategories in Environment 
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Figure 7.  Comparison of Subcategories in Biology 
From Figure 8, it is evident that trauma during young and later ages, 
coupled with the personality of the individual, emerges as the leading cause of 
placement in the losses frame. On the other hand, cultures, norms and values, 
Orientalism, and information saturation emerge as the least important ones. 
However, as has been already asserted in this thesis, many reasons that place a 
person in the losses frame cross categories. Some of these causes may be 
dependent on, or emanating from, another. The same assertion can also support 
the main data set, which shows that some individuals require more reasons for 
being in the losses frame than others, while for some only two or three reasons 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS: TRANSFERRING PEOPLE FROM 
THE LOSSES TO GAINS FRAME 
Always remember others may hate you, but those who hate you 
don’t win unless you hate them. And then you destroy yourself. 
 –Richard M. Nixon 
 
In the realm of counterterrorism pursuits, positive things may start with 
changing human thought, so transferring individuals from a losses frame to a 
gains frame involves changing their perceptions, ideas and understanding of the 
world in general and the immediate environment in particular. Besides influencing 
individuals positively, there will always be a need to influence through coercion 
and intimidation, thereby making such approaches a part of normative behavior. 
The application of both positive and negative influences is the same as applying 
societal norms through motivation and enforcements. It is important to instill in an 
individual’s mind that if he involves himself in any violent activities, not only are 
law enforcement agencies capable of catching and prosecuting him, but the 
judiciary is also capable of punishing him for his transgressions. Nevertheless, 
removing the idea of terror and violent activities from the minds of people who 
are in a losses frame is more important, and that removal is accomplished only 
through changing the ideological and environmental circumstances, which would 
also impact the psychological as well as biological reasons for being in a losses 
frame. 
As explained in Chapter IV, the causes of putting people in the losses 
frame are interlinked; therefore, the counter measures may also be 
interconnected. By changing the environmental circumstances such as providing 
better educational opportunities and, thus, a better future, society may influence 
an individual to not imitate his elders and follow a path of criminality. The 
measures for transferring people from the losses to gains frame will be more 
generalized in nature; however, the ultimate aim would remain to identify actions 
which will make people more risk averse. Therefore, putting people in the gains 
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frame will be analyzed through changing the prevailing narratives and adjusting 
the contexts that affect people’s ideology and psychology, as well as improving 
their physical environment, all of which, if left unchanged, predisposes them to 
the losses frame.  
A. THE NARRATIVES: INNOVATE AS WELL AS COMPROMISE  
Whoever kills an innocent person, it is as though he has killed all of 
humanity. 
 –The Quran 
Labeling an ethnic or religious group or a country as terrorist may serve in 
the short term to garner world support; however, in the long term, this labeling 
will unite the most disparate people into a bond, which will cross religious, ethnic, 
tribal, cultural and even territorial boundaries. In the post-9/11 period, the 
discrimination that people faced based on their skin color, appearance and 
apparel, especially in Western airports, is a case in point.  This discrimination, 
without producing any tangible, positive outcome towards counterterrorism 
actions, only served to put more people in the losses frame. In light of this 
situation, there is a need to have narratives which are innovative, vis-à-vis the 
opponent’s narrative, as well as conciliatory in their content to cater to the 
sensitivities of the target audience. Therefore, by either changing existing 
narrative or issuing new ones, more people will be brought into the gains frame; 
this may be accomplished by affecting the Subcategories of emotions, idealism, 
immigrant perceptions, cultural sensitivities, effects of information saturation, 
issues of identity, Orientalism and mental vulnerability of the young from the 
conflict areas.  
The narratives not only affect individuals, but may also put societies in the 
losses frame. The U.S. approach to providing material support for being part of 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is a case in point, where without a cogent 
supplementary narrative, the material support does not translate into positively 
influencing the general populace. The solution lies in avoiding the confrontational 
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narratives or changing them according to the cultural and temporal dictates, 
thereby driving a wedge between the general population and the extremists. In 
the narrative of the  WOT, both terms “War” and “ lobal,” were literally used by 
the terrorists as a global war against Islam. In the past, these and similar 
metaphors have been used for societal control; however, these must be used 
craftily, so that the opponent is unable to devise a counter-term like “Jihad.”  
In the wake of 9/11, the world joined the U.S. in condemning Islam as the 
originator of the violence. However, this narrative provided a useful tool for 
terrorist organizations that cashed in on this trend and launched a global jihad, a 
term again misunderstood by most.  As Atran writes:  
Like Crusade, the word Jihad has many nuanced and even contrary 
connotations. Thinkers I respect tell me that I shouldn’t use the 
word jihad because it’s a notion that, in the sense of an inner 
struggle for rightness and truth, applies to a vastly greater number 
of peaceful people than to terrorists, and that is true.221 
Consequently, blaming Islam and Muslims did not work; therefore, this thesis 
suggests that the counterterrorism efforts should stop labeling through the prism 
of religion, culture and ethnicity. An end to such labeling will not only stop people 
from moving towards the losses frame, but will also highlight a way to transfer 
them back towards the gains frame.  
The narrative surrounding the U.S. attack on Afghanistan to target and 
punish al-Qaeda elements and their sympathizers for 9/11 could have been more 
accurately portrayed to the Afghan populace in order to avoid the perception of 
American actions as an invasion and occupation of their lands. After toppling the 
Taliban regime, the U.S. narrative was molded to characterize the U.S. as a 
country which had come to Afghanistan as liberators and freedom providers, 
especially to the downtrodden female class; however, the acceptance of this 
narrative by the Afghan masses is still questionable. The best approach would 
have been to identify the perpetrators of 9/11, gain the sympathy of the general 
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public, and seek their help not only in exposing such elements in Afghan society, 
but also targeting them.  
In the GWOT, the narratives broadcast abroad have had a direct bearing 
on the immigrant populations from the Muslim countries who are living in the U.S. 
or in the West. Such confrontational narratives had far reaching effects on 
immigrants who have started to feel alienated in their new societies. This feeling 
was amplified by the native people’s aggression, who blatantly blamed the 
immigrants for the violent terrorist acts. In the aftermath of 9/  , America’s anger 
towards the Muslim immigrants residing in the U.S. was a natural outcome of the 
terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland; however, the narrative of Crusade adopted 
by U.S. President George W. Bush added more fuel to the fire, and the general 
public took it upon themselves to persecute innocent immigrants for the atrocities 
that occurred on 9/11. This process made Muslim immigrants question their true 
identity, and the only fallback position available to them was to look inwardly 
towards their ancestral identity. 
In hindsight, the best way to fight a tank division is with another tank 
division; therefore, the best way to fight against the terrorists’ narratives is to 
come up with prudent counter-narratives. In the absence of a genuine narrative, 
terrorists are clever enough to create their own, which may be completely 
divorced from reality. Martha Crenshaw writes, “The actions of terrorist 
organizations are based on a subjective interpretation of the world, rather than 
objective reality.”222 There could be two logics behind this: first, in the absence of 
a genuine narrative, it is easier to manipulate general perceptions through 
subjective interpretation, and second, even if a narrative is available, it is easier 
to propagate one’s own agenda through a juggernaut of words. Thus, counter 
narratives should not only identify such loopholes, but also exploit such gaps to 
alienate their sympathizers.  
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Although the jihadi terrorist organizations claim that they are fighting for a 
noble cause in the name of Allah, there are always elements, especially among 
the elites, who fight for their personal gains in the shape of unrestricted power, 
status and even money. In the same context, Ed Husain highlights the dichotomy 
between the religious rhetoric and actual religious practice by writing that “My 
qualm was about fairness: if we believed in segregation for Muslims and no 
private meetings between the sexes, then it ought to apply to us too.”223 
Therefore, one of the counter-narrative focuses should be to expose the true face 
of extremist terrorist organizations. 
For narratives to be authentic and acceptable to the target audience 
without prejudice, former terrorists and sympathizers who have denounced 
violent practices should be utilized to communicate counterterrorism narratives. 
However, to adopt this route, a normative change will be required by convincing 
the decision making echelons of the necessity to explore new possibilities, which 
may come at the cost of listening to, rather than finishing, the enemy. The 
biggest hurdle to this approach may be the existing institutional culture or 
unwritten code of not talking to the enemy. Institutional norms are basically 
ingrained in the assertion that there is no need to talk if military diplomacy is 
succeeding, or if talking to the enemy might portray weakness. Atran captures 
this predicament by quoting a de-radicalized Jemaah Islamiyah member, Farhin; 
“He is willing to come to America to explain how he sees things and to try to 
understand what others see.”224 But once Atran made this proposal to the major 
decision makers in the U.S., the response was that “some people laughed, 
others seemed bemused, and most rolled their eyes. It seemed that the idea of 
talking to our enemies to find out why they are our enemies could only come from 
Planet Fruitcake.”225  
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For the Israel-Palestine problem, a need exists to introduce a new 
narrative: for the Palestinians, that it is not possible to defeat Israel militarily; and 
for Israelis, that the Palestinians cannot be coerced through use of force. 
Therefore, they must negotiate. The Palestinian perspective has been endorsed 
by one of the PLO spokesmen, Abu-Sharif, who writes, “Why pretend we could 
defeat Israel by force of arms? If that wasn’t possible, why not face reality and 
deal?” Atran quotes Sheikh Hassan Yusef of Hamas on suicide bombers, “ od 
created people to live, not to die … we have to find an exit.”226 He also quotes 
former Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniya, “We need a dialogue of 
civilizations, not a clash of civilizations.”227 Those visions may serve as windows 
of opportunities to solve the problems by issuing new narratives.  
According to Hy Rothstein, “Narrative should always convey the justice of 
your cause, and the injustice of your opponent’s cause,”228 and until the time 
these basics are addressed, no narrative, however strong or convincing it may 
be, will achieve the desired results. As for initiating such narratives, 
understanding your opponent is a must, and patience will be the key that will 
unlock the most complicated minds. Admiral Michael G. Mullen concurs, adding:  
The Muslim community is a subtle world we don’t fully—and don’t 
always attempt to understand. Only through a shared appreciation 
of the people’s culture, needs, and hopes for the future can we 
hope ourselves to supplant the extremist narrative. We cannot 
capture hearts and minds. We must engage them; we must listen to 
them, one heart and one mind at a time—over time.229 
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Therefore besides the narrative, the context of understanding the cultural and 
tribal sensitivities is also important, because narratives should not remain only 
words.  
B. THE CONTEXT: UNDERSTAND AS WELL AS MODIFY  
Context is about past experiences, historical confrontations and even the 
present environment, which taken together basically shape individual and 
societal behavior. A context can be a cause as well as an enabler towards an 
end. According to John Arquilla, “A just cause for the conflict is both sword and 
shield,”230 highlighting the importance of the correct context and explaining the 
reasons for fighting. By understanding and, if required, by modifying the context, 
people who are in a losses frame due to historical baggage, geography, 
prevalent trends, vested interest of the elite and consequent shaping of a 
personality can be brought back into a gains frame.  
The context utilized by the U.S. forces for the invasion of Iraq was the 
presence of weapons of mass destruction; however, once that context proved to 
be false, things started to fall apart not only in Iraq, but also at home in the U.S. 
Admiral Michael  . Mullen writes, “More important than any particular tool, we 
must know the context within which our actions will be received and understood. 
We hurt ourselves and the message we try to send when it appears we are doing 
something merely for the credit.”231 
In the presence of such historical baggage, it will be extremely difficult to 
modify the existing contexts; people seldom forget the wrongs done to them, 
especially the deliberate ones. However, does this mean that in the presence of 
old enmity, new contexts cannot evolve?  The answer to this can be a “No,” 
because had this been the case, there would not have been any European Union 
or a peaceful Europe in the aftermath of World War II. This was made possible 
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by changing the context from confrontation to cooperation, from coercion to 
support, and from hatred to acceptance. But this cooperation, support and 
acceptance came through understanding the other side, thinking of them just like 
yourself and understanding their problems as your own.  
Ed Husain writes, “During the course of our lives we all change our views 
and direction; some of us do so more radically than others. …  Yet, with time and 
experience, I evolved.”232 Though the change towards a more positive side will 
be slow, it will ultimately come, if the contexts are used prudently. At the 
individual level, this change will come through changing individual behavior 
patterns and affecting the thought processes, which will occur only after affecting 
“hearts and minds.” Without the correct context, even a good action may not 
achieve the desired results and can be hijacked by the elites for their own 
personal or political interests. In Afghanistan, despite having good intentions like 
offering freedom from the oppression of the Taliban, the emancipation of women, 
and the introduction of democracy, the fact remains that even concrete actions in 
the shape of institution building, women’s education and economic benefits did 
not produce any long lasting positive impressions. This negative outcome was 
due to the original context of the invader or occupier, which resonated with the 
public either directly or was exploited by elites such as religious clerics who 
downplayed the effects of all the positives.  
In the era of globalization and diminishing boundaries, double standards, 
such as promoting freedom and democracy on one hand and supporting the 
authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes on the other, do not go unnoticed. From the 
pages of history, the U.S.-sponsored 1953 coup in Iran is a case in point. Trust, 
honesty and openness are important for all humanity; however, the context in 
which it is perceived in Eastern cultures is different. An action in isolation is not 
likely to increase or decrease the level of trust, but the context in which an action 
is taken will become more important. If the U.S. forces are to bring freedom to 
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the Iraqi people, the value of freedom to an Iraqi is also important. Therefore, to 
bring people from the losses frame to a gains frame may require understanding, 
as well as believing in, the prevalent norms amongst the target audience.  
The Prophet Mohammad once said, “Beware of extremism in religion; for it 
was extremism in religion that destroyed those who went before you.”233 A 
religion based on peace and denunciation of extremism has been hijacked by a 
few, and the world accepted their version as the true representation of the 
Muslim world. What comes to mind when you say that you are a Muslim in the 
West or in the U.S., is no different than when you say you are a Kurd in Turkey, 
an Irish Catholic in Britain, a Basque in Spain, or a Tamil in Sri Lanka. This 
generalization alone probably places more people in the losses frame than any 
other material cause, as putting the blame of few upon the masses does not 
prove helpful. This is the context which is successfully being exploited by terrorist 
organizations in order to motivate new recruits. Ed Husain echoes this view when 
he writes, “I have observed British Muslims being browbeaten …, demanding 
‘integration’ and an end to ‘parallel lives.’ The implied accusation, of course, is 
that Muslims are guilty of terrorism and that an undefined ‘integration’ will put a 
stop to it.”234 
To further change or modify the context, stop the dehumanization of the 
opponent. By being more humane towards one’s opponent, the other side may 
also be compelled to change their context of dehumanizing the enemy. If side A 
does not call side B “Satan,” then side B will also not call side A an “Axis of Evil.” 
If the opponent is called Satan, common people have no other option but to 
acquiesce; otherwise, they will be labeled as blasphemous. Serdar Bayraktutan 
explains a three way process: approach them on an equal playing field, 
communicate and keep talking, and do not dehumanize.235 
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Another approach is never to stop engaging with even your worst 
enemies. Abu Sharif writes about keeping people engaged by not letting them 
cross their point of no return, and not pushing them to the wall.236 He adds:  
By the end of 1988, the Israeli government had a very big problem 
… They had tried force, and it hadn’t worked … the IDF soldiers … 
[by] shooting dead, on average, one Palestinian demonstrator a 
day … kept the pot of hatred boiling. This was what their Iron Fist 
policy [amounted to] … day after day after day, the Israelis were 
sticking their bayonets into a hornets’ nest.237 
The asymmetry of force is also not helping in formulating the correct 
contexts because the force advantage the U.S. enjoys inhibits both a 
psychological as well as material sense of superiority, probably restricting 
adoption of a more malleable approach.  This superiority instills an impulse for 
quick results not actually feasible given the current threat scenarios faced by the 
world in general and the U.S. in particular. Former Secretary of Defense, Robert 
Gates says:  
These [asymmetric] conflicts will be fundamentally political in 
nature, and require the application of all elements of national 
power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and 
more a function of shaping behavior of friends, adversaries, and 
most importantly, the people in between.238 
Another step towards modifying the context relates to romanticizing the 
reckless heroes of the past. The Afghan Mujahideen of first Afghan War are a 
case in point, having now evolved into a class of their own “Afghan alumni.”239 
According to Atran, “the most important counterterrorism measure of all is to 
provide alternative heroes and hopes that are more enticing and empowering.”240 
On the issue of clearing the confusion, Atran quotes a senior Saudi official:  
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During the Afghanistan war [with the Soviets] we daily praised the 
mujahedin and Bin Laden in our newspaper. He was the leader of 
the Arab heroes. Mujahedin entered our vocabulary in a positive 
frame. Then we said he was bad. The people were confused. 
Before a hero and overnight a bad man. We had to reframe jihad to 
distinguish ‘moral Jihad” from the Takfiri ideology. The mujahedin 
had been heroes for us and for you [America] in Afghanistan, and 
now they were terrorists.241 
For some, the change of context may only relate to the physical 
improvements, though according to Atran, “People’s identity often trumps other 
values, particularly economic ones.”242 Therefore, certain physical contextual 
improvements may also have a positive impact on a people in the losses frame, 
and to support this assertion, Atran writes:  
In … [European countries] … second- and third-generation children 
of immigrants feel personal rage at the police who are hostile to 
them, at the majority culture that is suspicious of them, and at their 
inability to find decent jobs even if they have a good education. 
They witness the day-to-day humiliation of their elders by 
bureaucrats who treat them like idiot children too slow to complete 
the forms.”243 
This clearly links both tangible and intangible aspects related to context, 
which may have to be changed to bring people into the gains frame.  
C. THE PHYSICAL ASPECTS: CHANGE AS WELL AS IMPROVE  
If successfully altered, a physical environment previously filled with 
suffering, pain, and death may transfer people into the gains frame. In the same 
context, a generation which has suffered due to conflicts and instabilities in a 
society or a region is likely to be a ready-made, would-be talent pool for both 
terrorist and criminal organizations. However, if a generation is brought up 
enjoying modern education and the freedom to choose their destiny, and they are 
not sidelined due to their religious or political leanings, such an upbringing may 
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prevent the emergence of would-be terrorists. Ultimately the talent pool of 
potential recruits would dry up, as would the terrorist organizations.  
To support the view that the physical environment also shapes the 
behavior and practices of people, Atran quotes the alleged leader of Jemaah 
Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, about the environmental effects on individuals. 
According to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir: 
Environment can change people’s fitrah—nature ... If a person is 
raised in a Jewish environment, he will be Jewish. But if he is 
raised in an Islamic environment, he’ll follow his fitrah—nature ... 
the only things that can change a child into becoming Jewish or 
Christian are his parents or his environment.244  
This assertion also helps in supporting the idea that the environment will 
always have both positive and negative impacts on a person’s decision making 
processes, since it is the environment which puts people in either a gains frame 
or losses frame.  
In order to change or improve the physical environment, the first step 
could be the much needed political transitions from despotic authoritarian 
governance to more open and free democratic systems, and the starting point for 
this transition may involve confronting the allies. The U.S. needs to abandon its 
support of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, which though they may serve 
the West’s short-term purposes, in the end will prove counterproductive. The 
current U.S. stance on the Arab Spring is proving to be a new dawn on its Middle 
Eastern horizon, but the setbacks should not deter the U.S. from changing its 
strategic direction. Comparatively freer societies and systems will provide people 
the opportunity to express their frustrations and compel the regimes to address 
them, and in the long-term this will deter people from moving in the direction of 
the losses frame. 
By supporting more open and free systems, there will be an implicit 
change in the norms, cultures and practices. Hudson writes, “Because terrorism 
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is politically or religiously motivated, a counterterrorist policy, to be effective, 
should be designed to take into account political or religious factors. For example 
… the transition from military rule to democratic government in Chile proved to be 
the most effective counterterrorist strategy.”245 In the realm of political transition, 
the political elites and societal leaders play an important role, and their influence 
may move people either towards the losses or the gains frame. The examples in 
this regard are the tribal or family elders in the tribal areas of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, who though they have no prestigious positions can, nonetheless, 
mold opinions.  
Besides political transitions, the world’s powers should focus on bringing 
world conflicts to a just end. The current hotbeds like Palestine, Syria, Iraq and 
Kashmir, if resolved peacefully, probably will have positive impacts on the people 
of those regions and help in preventing them from transferring themselves into 
the losses frame. With regard to internal conflicts prevalent in Columbia, 
Philippines, Pakistan, Turkey and other parts of the world, the world’s great 
powers can support the ”Truth and Reconciliation Commission” of South 
Africa,246 and thus help end historical enmities. The current sectarian problems in 
Iraq, Syria and Bahrain, or the Kurd problem in Turkey can be good starting 
points.  
Economic aspects play a large role in improving the living standards of 
individuals, resulting in the long-term change of the societal behavior. Ed Husain 
quotes his teacher, “If you want to change the world, then you must get an 
education first,”247 which leads to the importance of having an equal opportunity 
through education, which ultimately will help in improving economic situations as 
well. According to a PKK terrorist:  
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The residents are not comfortable with terrorism. If you rescue 
them from the claws of poverty, give them good education; this will 
be a permanent solution to violence and terror. If the southeastern 
part of Turkey gets developed, the terror will not be accepted. Once 
the welfare and level of education increase, the humans will start to 
know themselves and will be able to control violence in them.248  
If education is to be a part of the solution, it is crucial to take into 
consideration the assets (physical environment) and ingredients (context) of that 
education. Thus, support for quality public education could be one means of 
attacking the reasons people are placed in a losses frame. According to Karin 
Von Hippel, some tentative steps have already begun in this direction; “the 
European Union has been exploring innovative approaches to working with the 
Pakistani Madrasa system.”249 But those efforts need to be substantial and well-
financed by the international community because such efforts go against the 
prevalent norms.  eorge Packer explains, “Spending 20 million dollars on 
schools in Afghanistan is a harder sell than spending four hundred billion on 
defense; fear is more compelling than foresight.”250  
Persuasion is yet another important aspect, and for this, the media is a 
great influential tool. It can be argued that terrorism as a tactic was employed 
before the media age, but now, due to unrestricted access, the media has 
become a tool in the hands of the terrorists who, through its clever manipulation, 
influence more people towards the losses frame. According to Atran, “Publicity is 
the oxygen that fires modern terrorism,”251 and thus media needs to be more 
responsible by at least ceasing to telecast violent pictures from the conflict areas. 
This exploitation of media is also referenced by Ed Husain who writes, “Boosted 
by intense media interest, we went from strength to strength. Nothing gave us 
greater motivation than to hear our ideas being amplified in the national media, 
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reaching new audiences of millions. To us it did not matter whether the coverage 
was favorable or otherwise.”252 
Currently, the media is able to reach the far away corners of the world in 
seconds; whatever comes on the television, radio, or is published in a newspaper 
or magazine, is seen, heard or read by huge numbers of people. Responsible 
media may serve as a training tool for the masses by influencing the positive 
domains. Bayraktutan writes, “Having a presence in the media has benefits for 
the [terrorist] organization as well as the individuals. The organization benefits by 
becoming widely known; whereas, for individuals, the media gives an opportunity 
to become a hero.”253 Thus, there is a need for strict implementation of a code of 
conduct, which will not be violated in order simply to be the first to air an event or 
make significant profits.  
In the physical domain, the most profitable route will be adopting the 
societal approach by making terrorism socially unacceptable. Western liberal 
societies need to draw a red line on too much civil liberty and consequently 
unbridled recruitment campaigns or open propaganda efforts by the terrorist 
organizations. Even in terms of cultural tolerance, there has to be a limit; it is 
always good to talk about freedom of speech, actions or religion, but there needs 
to be boundaries as well. Consequently, following the established norms may at 
times become dangerous, as freedom of speech was exploited by the Hizb in 
Britain, where Islamists were not stopped from spreading their hate filled 
messages. Ed Husain writes, “My warnings to university authorities and student 
union officials where I saw the Hizb and other groups recruiting in Britain … were 
repeatedly met with arguments defending the right to freedom of speech.”254  
However, to achieve the above approach, a delicate balance would have 
to be struck, and thus cultural sensitivity cannot altogether be abandoned. The 
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hijab issue is a case in point; instead of being simple apparel, it has now become 
a Muslim identity item. Ed Husain writes, “Hijab is losing tis spiritual significance 
and is instead becoming a marker of separatist identity politics.”255 Thus, showing 
a degree of cultural sensitivity will probably remain a valid concern, at least in the 
near future, for the U.S. and the West while operating in the conflict areas.  
According to Atran:  
Outsiders who do not understand local cultural and group dynamics 
tend to ride roughshod … As we find again and again—in our 
research in Morocco, Palestine, Iran, Pakistan, India, and 
Indonesia—helping to materially improve lives will not reduce 
support for violence, and can even increase it, if people feel such 
help compromises their most cherished values.256 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Cold War lasted until one side melted, not militarily, but economically, 
and paved the way for a unipolar world. The emergence of the U.S. as the sole 
super power, though, provided America a position of esteem, but probably also, 
injected a sense of complacency regarding its enemies.  There had been an 
understanding in the U.S. that after the demise of USSR, no other power in the 
world could challenge the U.S.’s might, both militarily and economically. 
However, a single terrorist incident seriously questioned that assumption, and 
after 9/11, the new threat scenario created many challenges, unprecedented and 
more complex in nature, which demanded more innovative, out-of-the-box 
approaches. But the application of a military instrument, as an accepted norm, 
though creating quick results in the short-term could not successfully conclude 
the conflict.  
Through this thesis, an effort has been made to identify the causes which 
both implicitly and explicitly direct people towards the risky and violent path of 
terrorism and, ultimately, into the folds of the terrorist organizations. These 
causes range from tangible material insufficiencies to more abstract and 
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intangible reasons, deeply etched in the psychological, cultural, and religious 
domains. Fortunately, these subtle reasons identified in this thesis are also 
finding their mark in the decision making circles of the U.S. administration. The 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates accepted the previously 
explained reasons of current conflicts by saying:  
One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: 
economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, 
promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic 
services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military 
and police forces, strategic communications, and more [of] these, 
along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term 
success.”257  
Out of all these reasons, this thesis has focused on the issue of strategic 
communication, or the public diplomacy domain, by identifying two important 
areas: narratives and contexts, both of which need to be improved or changed 
altogether. In addition, the importance of physical improvements have also been 
considered, because all three areas of influence are interrelated and may only 
function in collaboration. However, it is important to realize that financial or 
material support, without a cogent narrative and enabling context, may not be 
sufficient to bring people from the losses frame to a gains frame.  
In the same context, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael 
Mullen, highlights the importance of the strategic communication domain by 
saying, “We have allowed strategic communication to become a thing instead of 
a process, an abstract thought instead of a way of thinking.”258 He further writes 
with regard to Afghanistan, that “Our biggest problem isn’t caves; it’s credibility. 
Our messages lack credibility because we haven’t invested enough in building 
trust and relationships, and we haven’t always delivered on promises.”259 Had the 
narratives and contexts used in Afghanistan been related to just the targeting of 
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al-Qaeda elements, the Afghan masses would have been more receptive 
towards the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan.  
Through this thesis, the voices of the other side have been highlighted 
without prejudice and in their own words. Accordingly, the answers have also 
been derived from the problems communicated by the people who were more 
risk acceptant and in the losses frame at one time, but were brought into the 
gains frame. These suggestions are only words, and they may not have any 
impact unless transformed into actions. In the words of Admiral Michael Mullen, 
“To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our 
actions and much more about what our actions communicate.”260  According to 
Rudyard Kipling, “Words are, of course, the most powerful drug used by 
mankind,” and thus the journey towards peace and compromise may start with 
the right words at the right time.  
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